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ABSTRACT 
 
CIGALAZADE YUSUF SINAN PASHA: A 16TH CENTURY OTTOMAN 
CONVERT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD 
Biçer, Merve 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Vis. Asst. Prof. Evgeni Radushev 
 
September 2014 
 
This thesis focuses on the life of Scipione Cicala, also known as 
Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, who was a significant Genoese convert inside 
the 16th century Ottoman court. Based on the reports of the Venetian bailos and 
ambassadors in Constantinople, the study aims to draw a portrait of Cicala to 
indicate how these bureaucrats envisaged Cicala and his personal, political and 
economic relationships in line with the changes inside the Ottoman court and 
the Mediterranean Sea. Through his prestigious duties in both Eastern and 
Western parts of the Sultanate, his patronage networks, imperial marriages and 
his relations with hereditary family, this thesis aims to explain how an 
“Ottoman” diplomat was perceived both in his hometown (Italian peninsula) 
and in the Ottoman Empire. 
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Keywords: Cicala, Cigalazade, the Republic of Venice, the Ottoman Empire, 
Mediterranean world, converts, Kul system, Veneto- Ottoman relations, 
dispacci, relazione. 
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ÖZET 
 
CİGALAZADE YUSUF SİNAN PAŞA: AKDENİZ DÜNYASINDA 16. 
YÜZYIL OSMANLI DEVŞİRMESİ 
Biçer, Merve 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Evgeni Radushev 
 
Eylül 2014 
 
Bu tez, 16. yüzyıl Osmanlı sarayında bulunan ve önemli bir devşirme 
olan Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Paşa olarak bilinen Genovalı Scipione Cicala’nın 
hayatına odaklanmaktadır. İstanbulda ikamet eden dönemin Venedik bailosları 
ve büyük elçilerinin yazdığı raporları temel alan bu çalışma, bu bürokratlarının 
Cicalayı ile Osmanlı sarayı ve Akdeniz içindeki değişimler çerçevesinde 
kurduğu kişisel, politik ve ekonomik ilişkilerini  nasıl gözlemlediklerini 
göstererek, bir Cicala portresini çizmeyi amaçlar. Devletin doğusunda  ve 
batısında aldığı önemli görevler, patronaj ilişkileri, hanedan evlilikleri ve öz 
ailesi ile  kurduğu ilişkiler göz önünde bulundurularak, bir “Osmanlı” 
diplomatının hem doğduğu topraklarda hem de Osmanlı Devleti içinde nasıl 
algılandığını göstermek amaçlanmaktır. 
vi 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Cicala, Cigalazade, Venedik Cumhuriyeti, 
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Akdeniz dünyası, devşirmeler, Kul sistemi, Osmanlı-
Venedik İlişkileri, dispacci, relazione. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Subject and Sources 
 
The second half of the sixteenth century was a turning point both for the 
Ottoman court and for the relations between the Empire and the Republic of 
Venice in terms of changing political and economic dynamics and the balance of 
power. In this period, the Venetian commercial activities in the Levant shifted to 
the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to combat new enemies, such as England and 
France, along with other Italian maritime states1 such as Florence, Ragusa and 
Genoa, Venetians gave further importance to their political ties established with 
the Ottoman court by their permanent representative (bailo) and their 
                                                          
1
 The Italian peninsula between the 9th and 15th centuries was composed of many independent 
states mostly in the central and northern regions of the peninsula. By the 11th century, many cities, 
such as Venice, Milan, Florence, Genoa, Pisa, Siena had become large trading metropolises, which 
were able to conquer independence from their formal sovereigns. Besides, The Ottoman Empire 
cooperated with Genoa, Venice’s rival, on the sea, granting the Genoese extensive commercial 
privileges as early as 1352 and later on giving them a long term monopoly over alum production in 
the area of Magnesia.     
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ambassadors.2 Moreover, in this period the viziers, who were a part of the Kul 
system as the servants of the Sultan and members of the Ottoman bureaucracy, 
started accumulating power and wealth and created their own network inside the 
court to sustain their position against the central government. In the second half of 
the sixteenth century, Sultans started to establish their own network through their 
musahibs (imperial favorites) to break the viziers’ patronage networks. At the 
same time, women in the court established their own factions in order to balance 
their power inside the court.3  
This thesis centers on the life of Scipione Cicala,who was known as 
Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan in the Ottoman court,4 in order to understand how 
Venetian bailos and ambassadors envisaged Cicala due to the changes both inside 
the court and in the Mediterranean Sea. Through his prestigious duties in both 
Eastern and Western parts of the Sultanate, he established networks of patronage 
and family and maintained his relations with his original family in Sicily, which 
was under Spanish authority, even after his entrance into the court. Focusing on 
these relations, this thesis aims to explain how an “Ottoman” diplomat was 
perceived both in his hometown (Italian peninsula) and in the Ottoman Empire.  
This work sets out to explain Cicala’s position and his career’s ups and 
downs inside the court through the networks established by his marriages and 
                                                          
2
 Halil İnalcık, "An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations," in Venezia: Centro di Mediazione tra 
Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e Problemi, ed. Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos 
Manoussacas, and Agostino Pertusi (Florence: Leo S. Olschk, 1977), 83-90. 
3
 Günhan Börekçi and Şefik Peksevgen, “Court and Favorites,” in Encyclopedia of the Ottoman 
Empire, eds. Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 151-154 and 
Maria Pia Pedani, “Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy,” Turcica 32 (2000), 9-32.  
4
 In the Venetian reports, the name Cicala was used instead of Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan. We can 
also see variations of the name, such as Cigala or Cigalla. Hereby I will use Cicala in reference to 
Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan throughout the thesis.   
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cooperation with other important court figures and their protection. It also aims to 
understand the identity of a convert who was once a Genoese corsair and then 
became an Ottoman statesman through the relations he established with other 
representatives of the Italian peninsula such as Safiye Sultan, Chief White Eunuch 
Gazanfer and especially the Venetian bailos. An examination of the relations 
among these figures or their relations with other bureaucrats from different ethnic 
backgrounds helps us understand if their identities contributed to the 
establishment of stable factions or relations among these people, or with the 
Republic of Venice. In addition, with relations and dispatches of the different 
bailos, who observed the changing attitude against the Republic inside the court 
and the Mediterranean Sea, this work aims to explore the perception of an 
Ottoman convert from the Venetian aristocracy, who always alienated themselves 
from the notion of the convert. Through the chronical writers who witnessed the 
period, such as Mustafa Ali, Peçevi, Selaniki, Naima and Hasan Beyzade (except 
for Naima) this thesis tries to understand different aspects of the events and 
figures to complete the Venetian point of view.  
Beyond the fear of Turks, as a famous Italian proverb reveals “Oh mother, 
the Turks are coming!”(Mamma,  li Turchi!)5, Italian city- states never interrupted 
their relations with the Ottoman Empire due to their interest in the Levant. The 
Republic of Venice in particular established this position more systematically. 
The Venetians observed the Empire and the Sultan’s servants in order to stabilize 
and keep their position under control as much as possible. They also gave 
importance to the ethnic background and social position of the converts to 
                                                          
5
 Şerafettin Turan, Türkiye- İtalya İlişkileri: Selçuklular’dan Bizans’ın Sona Erişine,Vol. 1 
(İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990), 9. 
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understand their new identity as Ottoman statesmen. Cicala became a very 
significant figure, which indicates that the Mediterranean world of the sixteenth 
century was open to dialog and interaction between different states and religions.   
From one side, the figure of Cicala reveals the qualifications of a convert 
who was able to obtain a very different social and economic position by changing 
his religion. Cicala improved his position and used his skills as a corsair to 
become a capable admiral in the Ottoman Empire. His relations with the Venetian 
bailo help us to see how he situated his position with the Ottoman Sultan and 
inside the court as well. He also allows us to see how the Republic of Venice 
regarded the converted Ottoman statesmen and how these people situated 
themselves inside the court. Finally, the presence of his brothers Filippo, Carlo 
and his mother makes him a more noteworthy example. Cicala’s case draws a 
picture of a Mediterranean man who could easily come and go between different 
boundaries, as Emilio Sola named his book “Los que van y vienen”6.  Besides, this 
shows that the Mediterranean Sea was united by its geographical, cultural and 
economic qualifications as Braudel depicted.7 
In order to understand these dynamics and changes inside and outside the 
court, the Venetian documents of the bailo8 and extraordinary ambassadors9 have 
                                                          
6
 Emilio Sola Castaño, Los que van y vienen: Información y fronteras en el Mediterráneo clasico 
del siglo XVI (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2005).   
7
  Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. 
Siân Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1973). 
8
 Bailo was the protector and representative of the Venetian subjects inside the Ottoman court in 
the name of the Venetian Republic.  
9
 Oratore straordinario was the extraordinary ambassador sent to Constantinople only for peace 
treaties and important celebrations such as enthronement of a new Sultan. The Ambassador only 
presented his relazione when he turned back to Venice after his mission. 
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crucial significance.10 These letters, which were written daily, were named 
dispacci (dispatches) and those which were written as final reports at the end of 
the bailo’s stay in Constantinople and read in the Venetian Senate were named 
relazioni (relations).  
With the agreement of 1540 with the Ottomans,11 each Venetian bailo had 
the possibility of staying in Constantinople for three years and continued the 
tradition of writing their dispacci nearly every day. The final report, relazione 
explains the Ottoman territories, its military and administrative institutions, and 
the qualifications of the Sultan of that period with the important figures close to 
him. Along with the social, political and economic conditions of the Empire, the 
bailo summarizes the relations of the Ottoman Empire with its neighbors and 
enemies. The bailos inform the Republic also about the conditions of the Venetian 
subjects, his own household and the commerce of the Levant. While a relazione 
draws a general picture of the Ottoman Empire with its institutions and main 
figures, the dispatches explain the ongoing daily routine not only inside the court 
but also inside the Empire.  
Through these reports, it becomes easy to understand the relationships 
between the sultan, his family and his bureaucrats inside the court. In addition, the 
decisions made by important figures, the establishment of their relations with 
Ottoman or foreign statesmen becomes more clear. While the bailo also observed 
the social and economic life of the Sultan’s subject people, we can see the other 
                                                          
10
 For detailed sources on the Venetian bailo, see Tommaso Bertele Venedik ve Konstantiniyye: 
Tarihte Osmanlı- Venedik İlişkileri, trans. Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012); 
Eric Dursteler İstanbuldaki Venedikliler: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
11
 Bertele, Venedik ve Kostantiniyye, 99. 
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side of the established systems of the Ottoman Empire inside the court: hatred and 
intrigue among important Viziers, Sultanas or other bureaucrats, which resulted in 
the establishment of factions. Through the detailed descriptions of the bailos we 
can contextualize significant court figures from the beginning of their career to the 
end. This is of particular importance as the Ottoman documents are typically not 
very helpful for us to understand the creation of an Ottoman statesman’s identity 
because they tend to omit the person’s interactions inside and outside the court as 
well as his early life before the court, except for the Ottoman chronic writers who 
participated in the events themselves and narrated them from their point of view 
as eye-witnesses.  
Among these Venetian reports, this study mainly focused on the 23 files 
(filze) that indicate the period between 1576 and 1609 when Cicala became the 
target of the Venetian bureaucrats. According to Cicala’s personal life, court life 
or his relations with the bailo, some files included five or six letters written on 
different days. There are even rare cases where the bailo wrote several letters on 
the same day. With the dispatches, it becomes clearer to understand the reasons 
that affected the ups and downs of Cicala’s career and the establishment of his 
identity as Genoese by origin and as an Ottoman statesman. They also show us the 
details of his relations with the court people and his hometown. It becomes easier 
to see Cicala’s relationships with his hereditary family, his visits to his mother and 
his attempts to establish a career for his youngest brother Carlo inside the 
Ottoman Empire. In addition, through dispacci we can see how he regarded the 
Spanish Empire and the Papal State by following his excursions in the 
Mediterranean Sea through the Italian peninsula and Venetian dominions. The 
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dispacci are also instrumental in making clearer the reasons of Cicala’s immediate 
rise and fall in his political life. After the Ottoman- Habsburg war of 1596, he 
obtained the title of Grand Vizirate for only a month. Furthermore, on the Safavid 
frontier in the last period of his life, he had many defeats despite his supreme 
authority.  
Other important sources are the Relazioni of Gianfrancesco Morosini, 
Giovanni Moro, Matteo Zane, Lorenzo Bernardo, Girolamo Cappello and 
Ottaviano Bon that explain their relations in the Senate of the Venetian Republic 
between 1585 and 1609.  These relations help to understand the situation in the 
Mediterranean Sea, and the Hungarian and Safavid frontiers, where Cicala had 
important duties. These documents also draw a general picture of the social, 
economic and political atmosphere around Cicala, which helped situate him inside 
the court among the Ottoman statesmen and foreign ambassadors, mainly the 
Venetian ones.  
Along with the Venetian relazioni and dispacci, the diary of the 
ambassador Leonardo Donà, who stayed in Constantinople in 1595 narrates all 
aspects of the capital and the Empire. The ambassador also makes very careful 
observations about the relations between the foreign and Ottoman court figures.12 
Another important source is Stephan Gerlach, who was an orator of the Habsburg 
Ambassador who eye-witnessed the period between 1577 and 1578, which 
coincides with the very early Ottoman life of Cicala.13  
                                                          
12
 Leonardo Donà, Itinerario... Memorie... Relatione.... Ambasciatori.... Costantinopoli, Fondo 
Donà dalle Rose, 23, 68r- 226v (dated October 27, 1595). 
13
 Stephan Gerlach, Türkiye Günlüğü, trans. Türkis Noyan, ed. Kemal Beydilli, 2 vols. (Istanbul: 
Kitapyayınevi, 2006). 
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The reports the Venetian Senate (deliberazioni) and some dispatches of the 
governors of the islands, such as Deer Island in the Indian Ocean, Cyprus, 
Zakynthos and Milos, also help us see the position of Cicala and especially his 
father Visconte Cicala. Through these sources, we can see how the corsair 
activities of the Cicalas remained without punishment and how they moved easily 
in the Mediterranean Sea close to important Venetian dominions such as Cyprus, 
Corfu and Crete.  
The Calendar of the State Papers related to English affairs in Venice, 
summed up the dispatches related to Cicala’s relations with foreign ambassadors 
inside the court. These documents show the English point of view and reveal 
details of Cicala’s attitude towards the Spanish, French and English ambassadors 
despite their limited information to draw Cicala’s portrait. 
Ottoman chroniclers reveal significant information on his character and the 
events and circumstances around him, which helps us to enrich Cicala’s portrait. 
The chroniclers such as Mustafa Ali, Selaniki, Peçevi and Hasan Beyzade, who 
lived in the same period with Cicala, reveal different aspects of the same events or 
court figures as they were members of different factions.  
In addition to the Ottoman chronicles, Koca Sinan Pasha’s informative 
notes (sing. telhis) presented directly to the Sultan point out how Sinan Pasha 
negatively affected the decision making of the Sultan when Cicala was on the 
point of becoming the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada. Moreover, while 
presenting his own idea to the Sultan, he revealed not only the qualifications of 
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the statesmen but also the conditions of different institutions and situations such 
as the financial sources of the Empire and the condition of the Arsenal. 
It should be noted here that Venetian bureaucrats sometimes 
misunderstood the process of Ottoman traditions and establishment of institutions 
or they exaggerated the situation. Moreover, as they alienated themselves from the 
figure of the convert, they had a very subjective and often humiliating 
interpretation of the converts inside the Empire even when the converts had 
brilliant careers.  
The different perceptions of the image of Cicala in the Ottoman chronicles 
and the Venetian documents define the methodology of this study. In this context, 
while analizing the narrations on Cicala, I examine what these documents reveal 
about Cicala, and his Mediterranean and Ottoman environment as well as the 
manner in which these were told. 
 
1.2 Historiography 
 
 
One of the most important early studies written on Cicala is the study of 
Cardinal Ilario Rinieri’s Clemente VIII e Sinan Bassa Cicala. Rinieri depicts a 
convert who could not separate himself from his hereditary religion and family 
and even tried to change his religion in the last period of his lifetime. According 
to Rinieri, who used archival sources of the Vatican, Cicala even tried to 
10 
 
cooperate with the Spanish Empire and Pope Clement VIII.14 Rinieri’s work is 
very valuable through the richness of the archival sources and helps us understand 
Clement VIII’s relation with Cicala. The study of Gaetano Oliva Sinan Bassá, 
Celebre Rinnegato del Secolo XVI, is a more detailed study which was published 
as two articles in 1907 and 1908.15 Although both studies reveal important 
information about Cicala’s relations with the Pope, his maritime activities and 
intervention in the Calabrian problem, it draws the figure of Cicala very 
subjectively, as a very valuable loss of Catholic belief who tried to recompense 
for it.  
Gino Benzoni in his article on Cicala in the Dizionario Biografico degli 
Italiani in 1981 reveals more detailed and less subjective research.16 In addition to 
criticizing the interpretation of Oliva and Rinieri, Benzoni also uses Venetian 
archival sources.  
On the phenomenon of Cicala, Evrim Türkçelik makes a very significant 
contribution with his work Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha y el Mediterráneo entre 
1591- 1606. Türkçelik examines the appointment of Cicala as the admiral of the 
Ottoman Armada and its reflections both inside the Ottoman Administrative 
system and the Mediterranean world. With the contribution of Spanish and 
Venetian archival sources, he points out the Spanish Empire’s close observance 
and intents to trace the Venetian policy of Cicala. In addition, he shows the 
changing attitude of the sixteenth century Ottoman bureaucracy in Mediterranean 
                                                          
14
 Ilario Rinieri, Clemente VIII e Sinan Bassa Cicala (Roma: Civiltà Cattolica, 1898). 
15
 Gaetano Oliva, “Sinan-Bassa (Scipione Cicala) Celebre Rinnegato Del Secolo XVI”, Archivio 
Storico Messinese, VIII (1907), 267-303 and IX (1908), 70-202. 
16
 Gino Benzoni, “Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan)”, Dizionario Biografico degli 
Italiani (DBI) (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1981), XXV. 
11 
 
politics. He also examines the transformation of Spanish oriental policy during the 
transition from the reign of Philip II to the reign of Philip III.17 
“Das «negotium secretum» der Familie Cicala” of Jan Paul Niederkorn, on 
the other hand, uses Spanish Archival sources to show the position of the Spanish 
court against Cicala’s conversion.18 V.J Parry, Tayyip Gökbilgin and Mahmut 
Şakiroğlu also write encyclopedia entries on Cicala by using the Ottoman 
documents. More than Cicala’s Mediterranean activities, these entries focus on 
Cicala’s role in the Ottoman- Hungarian wars and the Safavid frontier.19 In 
addition to these studies, Günhan Börekçi, Cornell Fleischer, Baki Tezcan and 
Emrah Safa Gürkan also mention Cicala in order to explain the political, social 
and administrative changes both inside the Empire and the Mediterranean Sea in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, where Cicala played a role.20   
Although the Mediterranean history is among the most studied subjects, 
we should mention Fernand Braudel, whose Méditerranée et le monde 
Méditerranéen à l’époque de Philippe II was published first in 1949 and became a 
classic of Mediterranean studies. In his book, Braudel focuses on the common 
elements of Mediterranean history and then unifies all geographical, political, 
                                                          
17
 Evrim Türkçelik, Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha y el Mediterráneo entre 1591- 1606, 
unpublished Ph.D thesis, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, 2012. 
18
 Jan Paul Niederkorn, “Das «negotium secretum» der Familie Cicala”, Mitteilungen des Instituts 
für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 101(2-4), 1993, 425- 434. 
19
 V. J. Parry, “Cighala-zade Yusuf Sinan Pasha, Encyclopedia of Islam (Leiden and London, 
1978), vol. II, 33-34; M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, “Cigalazade”, Islam Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul, 1940- 
1986), vol. III, 161-164; Mahmut Şakiroğlu, “Cigalazade Sinan Paşa”, TDVIA, vol. II, 525-526. 
20
 William J. Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1591-1611 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 
1983); Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian 
Mustafa Âli (1541 -1600)(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Baki Tezcan, The Second 
Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010); Günhan Börekçi, Factions and Favorites at the Courts of 
Sultan Ahmed I and His Immediate Predecessors, unpublished Ph.D thesis, The Ohio State 
University, 2010; Emrah Gürkan Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret 
Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go- Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg Rivalry, unpublished Ph.D 
thesis, The Georgetown University, 2012. 
12 
 
economic and social elements of the Mediterranean World.21 Another important 
historian, Andrew Hess, mainly focuses on the political and religious differences 
of the Mediterranean World.22  
Alberto Tenenti, Gino Benzoni23 Paolo Preto24 and Tommaso Bertelè25 and 
Eric Dursteler,26 reveal different aspects of the Veneto-Ottoman relations and 
figures as well as point out the Venetian bureaucrats and subjects inside the 
Ottoman Empire. Salvatore Bono and again Tenenti focus on corsairs, pirates and 
elaborate on different aspects of the Mediterranean Sea.27 These studies give 
significant information on the activities of the pirates of Uskoks, Malta and 
Barberia. They also describe the entrance of the English and Dutch piracy in the 
competition and show the position of the Republic of Venice in a time of 
important changes in the Mediterranean World. 
On the notion of converts, Lucetta Scaraffia, Bartolomé y Lucile 
Bennassar, Salvatore Bono, Natalie Zemon Davis, Miguel Ángel de Bunes 
Ibarra28 emphisize encounter and interactions through corsair activities and 
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political conflicts and conquests in the Mediterranean Sea. Emilio Sola, Benjamin 
Arbel, Natalie Rothman and Paolo Preto29 explore the people who became 
acceptable subjects on both sides such as merchants and advisers or favorites and 
spies.  
The works of Maria Pia Pedani on Safiye Sultan30, Benjamin Arbel on 
Nurbanu Sultan31, Ebru Turan on Ibrahim Pasha,32 Antonio Fabris on Hasan 
Veneziano33, Elvin Otman on Alvise Gritti34 and Emilio Sola and Gustavo 
Valente on Uluç Ali 35 show different aspects of these important converts in terms 
of their identity and their relations with the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman 
Empire. 
Since the Italian peninsula experienced the invasion of Otranto during the 
reign of Mehmed II, the fear of “Turks” became a significant concern even in the 
16th century politics of the Italian city- states. In their studies, Giovanni Ricci, 
                                                                                                                                                               
norte de África en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII: los Caracteres de una Hostilidad (Madrid: 
Instituto de Filología, CSIC, 1989). 
29
 Sola Castaño, Los que Van y Vienen; Benjamin Arbel, Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in 
the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995); E. Natalie Rothman, 
Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2012); Preto, Paolo. I Servizi Segreti di Venezia. (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994). 
30
 Pedani, “Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy”, 9-31. 
31
 Benjamin Arbel, "Nur Banu (c. 1530-1583): A Venetian Sultana?", Turcica, 24 (1992), 241-259. 
32
 Ebru Turan. The Sultan’s Favorite: Ibrahim Pasha and the Making of the Ottoman Universal 
Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Suleyman (1516-1526), Ph.D thesis, University of Chicago, 
2007. 
33
 Antonio Fabris, “Hasan ‘il Veneziano’ tra Algeria e Costantinopoli,” Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5 
(1997): 51-66. 
34
 Elvin Otman, The Role of Alvise Gritti within the Ottoman politics in the Context of the 
“Hungarian Question” (1526-1534) (M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2009).   
35
 Emilio Sola Castaño, Uchalí: El Calabrés Tiñoso, o el Mito del Corsario Muladí en la Frontera 
(Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2011); Gustavo Valente, Vita di Occhialì. (Milano: Casa Editrice 
Ceschina, 1960). 
14 
 
Mustafa Soykut and Özlem Kumrular point out the perception of this fear besides 
its effects and reflections in the Mediterranean.36    
Metin Kunt, with his important article Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in 
the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Establishment,37 explains the establishment of 
the factions or the cooperation among the converts according to their ethnic 
origin.  He also points out the important converts’ interactions with their 
hereditary families. Bir Osmanlı Kimliği of Salih Özbaran should also be 
mentioned for he mainly emphasized the image and significance of Rumi identity 
both from Ottoman and foreign perceptions. He also explains the perception of 
“Turks” in the Italian peninsula and their contribution to the spread of this image 
in Europe.38 
Despite the number of the studies on Cicala that has been done, we do not 
have a portrait of Cicala, which takes the dynamics inside the Ottoman Empire 
and the Mediterranean into consideration.  In other words, although this thesis 
utilizes the Venetian documents as a basis, it aims to draw a portrait of Cicala, 
while explaining Ottoman administrative, political, economic and social 
dynamics, which affected both the Ottoman court life and the life in the 
Mediterranean. Among the foreign documents that reveal important details about 
the Ottoman court life, the Venetian ones are outstanding. By drawing a detailed 
potrait of Cicala and his period, this study gives the possibilty of comparison with 
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other foreign and Ottoman sources that depicts the 16th century Ottoman court 
with the important figures inside it. By doing so, it will contribute to a more 
detailed history writing of Cicala and the world around him by comparison of 
various narrations. I also aimed to make a contribution to the literature by 
observing the relation between Cicala and his brother Carlo from the Venetian 
point of view, since Cicala and his family were on the agenda of the Europeans, 
particularly of the Papal State, the Spanish Empire and the Venetian Republic. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
CICALA AND THE WORLD AROUND HIM 
 
 
 In this chapter, I will explain the Kul system of the Ottoman state and how 
the Venetians envisaged this system. In doing so, I aim to portray both the system 
in which Cicala arose as an admiral of the Ottoman Armada  and Grand Vizier, 
and to see the relationship between the Venetian bailos and  Cicala with the 
background of the image of Cicala that they envisaged. 
 
2.1 Establishment of Kul system in the Ottoman Empire 
 
As a Near Eastern Muslim state power, the entire ruling system of the 
Ottoman Empire depended on the will of the ruler. The Kul system included all 
the servants of the Sultan, from the lowest to the Grand Vizier who were equal to 
one another and responsible only to the rulers. In the fifteenth and sixteenth 
17 
 
centuries, the Ottoman Kul status was limited to one’s position in the social 
system. The military unites (ehl- i seyf = men of the sword) dealt with conquests, 
organization and administration of the state. The non- military masses (sürüler or 
reaya = herd) were obligated to deal with public production and to pay their taxes. 
Considered in this way, the Ottoman Empire looks like a centralized state 
of an Eastern conceptual type with a perfectly functioning socio- economic 
mechanism, which determined the place of every person in society.39 From the 
beginning, the Ottoman Empire protected its nucleus; the military group 
organized among their leader Osman Ghazi, which became the keystone of the 
entire socio- political structure.40  
In the Ottoman Kul system, slavery depended on resignation to the will 
and command of the Ottoman Sultan, where, in return, subjects took the honor of 
representing his unique authority.41 The chief distinctive feature behind the 
directly empowered senior ruling elite and the numerous bureaucrats of the State 
offices was the Janissary Corps and the Six Regiments- all united by their being 
Kul of the sultans. In this respect the sultan’s slaves were filled with the 
awareness of their own enormous importance for the State, and with self-
confidence, claiming that they were “the right hand and the wing of the Ottoman 
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dynasty”, as pointed out in the Janissaries’ regulations.42 Lybyer states this 
comintment of the Kul members:  
The most vital and characteristic features of the this institution 
were, first, that its personnel consisted, with few exceptions, of men born 
of Christian parents or of the sons of such, and second, that almost every 
member of the Institution came into it as the sultan’s slave throughout life 
no matter to what height of wealth, power and greatness he might attain.43 
 
Then Lybyer explains the motivation of the slaves not to return to their old 
religions after becoming a part of the Ottoman administration system:  
“The Ottoman system deliberately took slaves and made them 
ministers of the state, it took boys from the sheep- run or the plow- tail and 
made them courtiers and husbands of princesses, it took young men whose 
ancestors had borne the Christian name for centuries and made them rulers 
in the greatest of Muslim states, and soldiers and generals in the invincible 
armies whose main joy is to beat down the Cross and elevate the 
Crescent…”44  
 
The Christians who converted to Islam in the Kul system were taken 
according to their skills and tactics  in order to be used against their ex-patriots. In 
the times of war or conquests, they became primary pioneers that were famililar 
with the habits and situation of their lands of birth and and moved in their old 
territories easily. Often, they also had the opportunity of sending money to their 
hereditary families.45 Islam turned into an occasion to provide a larger field of 
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maneauver in social and political spheres, even if that meant being the slaves of 
the Sultan.46 
The Ottomans directly adopted the institution of slavery from the 
Anatolian Seljuks. The Seljuk Sultans had personal guards named has gulam 
(imperial slaves) that were a mix of Anatolian Christians who were slaves or 
prisoners of war. They followed the Sultan during war time, while in peace time 
they provided the security of the palace. Their training took place in special palace 
schools named taşthane or (gulamhane). There they were chosen as different 
categories of guards and were trained as candar, silahdar,  or sipahi in oder to 
form the Seljuk military order.47  
The Seljuk regular army, organized in this fashion, was full of converted  
Greeks, Armenians and even Western Europeans. Many of the members of the 
Sultan’s Council (Divan) and other senior state officials were imperial slaves (has 
gulâm ) who had made their way up their career ladders.48 Anatolian Seljuks 
succeeded in building up an armed organization based on service landownership 
which was under Byzantine influence and on the regular army of slaves which 
was inspired by the Islamic tradition. This whole armed force was balancing the 
chaotic nomadic militarism of the Turkmens. Ultimately the unification of the 
tribes into one state and the conquest over practically all of Asia Minor from 
                                                          
46
 Local people converted to Islam in order to receive some favors from the ruling class, such as 
exemption from taxes, promotion in bureaucracy and so forth. See Richard Maxwell Eaton, The 
Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press), 116. 
47
 Mustafa Akdağ, Türkiye’nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi, Vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
1959-1971), 269- 281. 
48
 Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (London: The Royal Asiatic Society of Great 
Britain and Ireland, 1966), 28-30. 
20 
 
Byzantium called for a strong central power, which relied on an efficient and 
disciplined army. 
The Kul system transformed during the reign of Mehmed  II with the 
trasformation into the Ottoman structure of administration as a homogenized 
society. In order to establish his centralized authority, the Sultan tried to abolish 
the pre-Ottoman Anatolian and Balkan feudal aristocracies. From one side, the 
political, military, and economic elite of the Balkan territories were defeated on 
the battle field. Then these local feudal nobles were integrated into the Ottoman 
state structure in the army or into the local and central administration, so they 
could have a chance to continue their existence as a political and economic force. 
On the other side, the elites of the Anatolian Seljuks namely beyliks, were 
integrated into the system by purchasing large estates. The malikâne-divanî 
system was an ownership shared between the landowner and the centralized State: 
part of the revenue collected by the owner of the states (the malikâne part), and 
the other (divanî) remained at the disposal of the State and usually the treasury 
gave it as timar. In the timar system, The Christian sipahis (fifteenth – first half of 
the sixteenth century) who in return for their military service received portions of 
the centralized rent as timars and turned to Islam in the course of time.49  
However, until Mehmed II, some influential families such as 
Evrenosoğulları, Mihaloğulları, Malkoçoğulları, and Turahanoğulları put the 
Sultan’s centralized power in jeapordy, when their interests did not coincide with 
his. In order to stabilize his power, Mehmed II confiscated all properties of his 
vizier and jailed him in Edirne after the capture of Constantinople. The Sultan also 
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abolished landownership of his statesmen and blocked their participation in 
governing. Although certain families like the Evrenosoğulları, Mihailoğulları or 
Firuzoğulları succeeded in preserving part of their estates, their economic and 
political influence remained local.50 
 Since the middle of the fifteenth century, people of varying ethnic origins 
gained a significant presence among the Ottoman ruling elites. Since as a rule the 
military- administrative system was filled with cadres trained in the Palace 
schools, practically all posts in the state administration were recruited by Greeks, 
Albanians, Serbs, Bosnians, Bulgarians etc. The ruling elite of the State was 
formed outside the Muslim- Turkish ethnos, or more precisely – with its minimal 
participation. The esteemed researcher of Ottoman History, Franz Babinger, 
reflecting on the perfectly elaborate Ottoman system of governing slaves, 
concludes: 
 While in other countries a rigid class structure held the common 
people down, on the Bosphorus the meanest slave could hope, through 
force of character and good fortune, to rise to the highest offices in the 
state. But this perfect social equality, which everywhere forms the 
foundation of Oriental despotism, existed only for the master race of the 
faithful. Between it and the reaya there yawned an enormous gulf.51    
   
According to Machiavelli, in the European West the people started to seize 
the power from the religious and aristocratic monopoly. In the Ottoman Empire 
“people” became “masses”. Even if Machiavelli did not observe very well the 
difference between reaya and the military organization in the social structure, he 
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analyzes very well the importance of the cavalry and infantry army of the 
devşirmes for the Sultan’s authority. It is remarkable that Machiavelli did not take 
into consideration the presence of the provincial sipahis and he assumed that they 
were not capable of influencing political development. However, the Janissaries 
did not appear simply as a military support system of the regime for conquests and 
suppression of internal opposition. The entire devşirme system and the Janissary 
organization, the Sultan’s guard units and corps who served the palace with their 
way of selection, training and command, formed the central authority as human 
potential. Therefore, we can say that “the Kingdom of the Sultan” was in the 
hands of his army. As Machiavelli stated: 
 “Nowadays, for all rulers, except the Sultan of Turkey and Egypt, it 
is more necessary to satisfy the people than the soldiers, because the 
people are now more powerful. The Sultan of Turkey is an exception 
because he always keeps twelve thousand foot- soldiers and fifteen 
thousand cavalry in his service near him, and the security and strength of 
his Kingdom depends on these forces. Hence, he must keep these forces 
friendly, and pay more regard to them than to others. Likewise, since the 
Kingdom of the Sultan of Egypt is completely in the hands of the soldiers, 
he too is obliged to keep them friendly, without considering what the 
people may want. 52 
 
 
2.2 Kul system in the European and the Venetian Perceptions 
 
The Ottoman Empire could not manage to make conquests on the Italian 
peninsula and settle in these lands as was feared of them. As Machiavelli 
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mentioned in a letter dated 1521, the Italian city-states  used to talk constantly of 
“the impending Turks and the crusades to be formed against them.”53 The event 
that caused the Italian city-states to perceive the presence of the “Turks” the most 
was the Ottoman expansion into Otranto after the fall of Constantinople. In 1480, 
all the Italian states but Venice formed a defensive alliance against the Ottomans, 
while Venice maintained its alliance with the Ottomans which was well known to 
other states.54 With Mehmed II’s death a year later, the “Turks” withdrew from 
this territory of the Kingdom of Napoli and the physical presence of the “Turks” 
at least came to an end on the Italian peninsula.  
However, the presence of the “Turks” continued to have its place in the 
minds and policies of Europeans. They constructed an identity of the “Turk” as an 
object of fear in discourse and defined them as the “other.” The Italian peninsula 
worked also as a station for Europe, which otherized and defined Turks as 
barbarians in the period of Ottoman encounter.55 Accordingly, in Alfonso d’Este 
II’s Ferrara, nobles joked about alleged raids by “Turkish” pirates and noble 
women set up games in which their knights were held hostage by these pirates.56 
These all indicate to us that a flow of orientalism started to flourish in Italy.  
In this context, poems and books that were written on “Turks” and their 
religion indicate that the Italian peninsula was making an effort to become 
acquainted with the Ottomans. As a prominent poet from the Kingdom of Naples, 
Torquato Tasso started writing his masterpiece Jerusalem Delivered (La 
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Gerusalemme Liberata) influenced by the unsuccessful siege of Hungary in the 
court of the Duke of Ferrara.57 Although unsuccessful, Paganino Paganini and his 
son Alessondro published a Holy Kur’an in Venice in 1538.58 
Firstly, it is necessary to consider the way the word Turks was used when 
we talk about the perception of Turks in Europe. What the Europeans meant by 
the word was Muslims in general. The Academy of Crusca in Florence defined the 
word “Turk” in 1691 to mean a person of the faith of Muhammed, not as 
Ottoman.59 According to Şerafettin Turan, among those who use the terms Turchi 
and Turchia, Italian literature had a significant place. Although the exact 
geography was lacking in this literature, the territory they meant were the areas 
Turks lived.60 
In a more common term, making himself Turk (farsi turco) signifies 
becoming a Muslim in the sixteenth century.61 These people, who became 
Muslims later on, could also be identified as “Turk by profession” (turco de 
profesión).62 Bailo Francesco Morosini stated that there were two types of 
“Turks”:  
One consists of those who are native- born of Turkish parents, while the 
other is made up of renegades who are sons of Christian parents, taken by 
force in the raids which the fleets and the irregular troops customarily 
conducts on Christian lands, or else they are from among the Signor’s 
subjects and tax- payers, removed by force from their own village. These, 
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while still children, are circumcised and made Turks either by enticements 
or by force.63  
 
Nevertheless, due to the power of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottomans 
became prominent as the “Turks”. The governor of Algiers Barbarossa from 
Lesbos, Hasan Pasha from Sardegna, Uluç Ali from Calabria and Hasan Pasha 
from Venice were the well known converts of the 16th century who became 
“Turks by profession” as the generals of the Ottoman Armada.  
There were also contribution of the Italians to Mehmed II during the siege 
of Constantinople. Ciriaco de Pizzicoli and Ciriaco de Ancona worked for the 
construction of the fortifications on the Bosphorus for the Sultan. The Genoese 
minority in the capital helped the Sultan to establish a bridge near Galata.64  There 
were also situations when the Italians were converted in masses: In 1544, 
Barbarossa made 4000 Ischia subjects his slaves in one excursion.  In 1588, there 
were 2500 Italian slaves from the Veneto region.65 Luigi Bennassar in his book 
named I Christiani di Allah observed the Spanish Inquisition documents and 
stated that there were 402 Italian and 459 Spanish converts between 1550 and 
1700.66 In the course of time the converts started to create buffer zones where 
their interests unified with the interests of the corsairs and the merchants of the 
Mediterranean Sea. For example there were islands such as Tabarca, Pantelleria 
and Lampedusa which paid taxes to both the Christian and Muslim authorities to 
                                                          
63
 Rothman, Brokering Empire, 94. 
64
 Scaraffia, Rinnegati, 8. 
65
 Ricci, Ossessione Turca, 57.  
66
 Bennassar, I Christiani di Allah, 144. 
26 
 
create a common and neutral area for commerce. In these regions the currency of 
both sides was valid.67  
Machiavelli, in his book named The Prince, makes an important analysis 
of the Ottoman Empire’s administration and Kul Sytem in which the “Turk by 
profession” arose, from his place as a contemporary observer of the period after 
Mehmed II. In the book, he tried to reveal important features of the governments 
of successful rulers and the differences among the powers that he observed. He 
also points out the establishment of the Ottoman Empire’s centralized power 
through the type of landownership and slavery system. This description gives us a 
great portrait of a European point of view of the Ottoman Empire. He firstly 
emphasizes the central power of the Ottoman Sultans and the governing of their 
territories. 
 The Turkish kingdom was governed by only one ruler and the 
others were his servants. The territories conquered by the Ruler were 
divided into sanjaks. The Sultan could know what was happening in all his 
dominions, as the sanjaks were directly connected to his authority. He 
could also send officers to various administrations whose places could be 
changed and moved as the Sultan pleased.68 
 
According to well- known politician from Florence, as the slaves of the 
Sultan owed their position to their unique ruler, they would remain loyal to him. 
Machiavelli did not believe that these servants could be easily dissuaded of their 
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loyalty. He warns that the enemies that wanted to engage in battle had to prepare 
very powerful armies instead of believing in the Sultan’s armies’ disunity.69 
 In the 16th century, one of the debates on the issue of the convert was the 
loyalty of the slaves to the ruler.  The priests of the Order of Sante Trinita’ that 
worked to return converts to their original belief in the Italian Peninsula, had this 
attitude against the notion of the convert: 
Generally Turks and Barbarians chose poor Christian youth that could not 
find anything to wear or eat while working in the ships or the poor young 
shepherds and showed them affection. When this youth who wore silk 
clothes, ate abundantly and protected by their servants, the conversion 
from Jesuit belief became a happiness whose teaching was not yet 
understood.70 
  
There were even some converts who found being Muslim more relaxing in 
terms of consuming wine and meat. During his Inquisitional interrogation, 
Giuseppe di Pozzoli confessed his desire to return to Torchia just in order to eat 
meat as he wished.71  
Until the end of the sixteenth century, the Inquisition of Rome did not put 
rigid regulations to block Christian conversion to Islam. For the first time in 1562 
the Inquisition started the interrogations. They did not give importance to the 
cases of Jews or Muslims that accepted Christianity. The main target of the 
Roman Inquisition in the 16th century were the converts who fought against 
Christianity after their conversion.72 The Italian peninsula was geographically 
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more open to interaction and changes in the Mediterranean. Moreover the Roman 
Inquisition remained slower to block the phenomenon of conversion when we 
consider the rigid regulations of the Spanish Inquisition.  
 According to reports of the Venetian bailos and ambassadors, the most 
disturbing side of conversion for the Venetian Aristocracy was the ease of social 
mobility. They found the rise of people to high ranking duties from the lower 
class unacceptable. Moreover, they did not believe in the sincerity of their 
conversion and did not regard them as faithful people.73 Marc’Antonio Barbaro in 
his relazione of 1573 stated that people who did not come from aristocratic 
families and learn the discipline of bureaucracy by birth tended to become 
arrogant after their conversion.74 For a Venetian bureaucrat who was aristocratic 
and would remain as such; honor, political discipline and nobility were 
qualifications that could not be obtained later. That is why Venetians always 
approached converts with suspicion. As they did not trust their conversion’s 
sincerity, they stood automatically as untrustworty.  
In the case of Cicala the situation was more disturbing, because, if Cicala 
became disloyal and untrustworthy, he would betray his Ottoman Sultan which 
would make only the Papal and Spanish states happy, while the Venetian interests 
would be jeopardized in the Levant and the Mediterranean Sea.75 For this reason, 
he never had a good image in the eyes of the Venetians. Another disturbance of 
the Venetians was the easy submission of converts to the Sultan in political and 
juridical terms. The Venetian bailo Gianfrancesco Morosini stated that:   
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“The renegades are all slaves, and are proud to be able to say, ‘I am a slave 
of the Gran Signor!’ For it is known that it (Ottoman Empire) is the dominion or 
the Republic of slaves, where it is they who are in command.”76 
   
 
 
2.3 The Developments Characterizing the 16th Century Veneto-Ottoman 
Relations 
 
2.3.1 Cooperation of Corsair Activities with Imperial Armies 
 
 From the beginning of the 16th century, the corsair activities started to 
significantly change the sphere of the Mediterranean Sea. Not only Christian 
Emperors but also Muslim sultans started to justify the aggressive activities of the 
corsairs with religious excuses under their protection in order to erode the other 
side. The Republic of Venice had a vast commercial network from the Aegean, 
Ionian and Adriatic Seas to Sicily and Gibraltar. In the same region, the Venetians 
tried to protect their vast commercial points and networks with both their military 
and commercial forces and to balance their position in the Mediterranean. 
Meanwhile, the European powers and the Ottoman Empire continued their 
maritime confrontations.77 Thanks to corsair activities, the political, military and 
commercial activities of the Islamic and Christian world integrated with the 
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movement of considerable goods and people. With the reinforcement of the 
Spanish Armada and the presence of Barbarossa in Egypt and Algiers, the 
Western Mediterranean became the point of interaction for the two powers.78  
Between 1575 and 1580, the Western powers of England, Holland and the 
Baltic Sea started to integrate themselves in the Mediterranean sphere, by moving 
both as commercial and corsair ships, which made the situation more complicated 
for the Venetians. They did not only attack the Venetian ships, but also from the 
1580s started to enjoy capitulations from the Ottomans. Although it was 
forbidden, in return they took necessary goods from the Venetian ports. Along 
with the new western merchants, there were Uskoks from Habsburg Croatia that 
were composed of Slavs and Dalmatians who escaped from the Venetian and 
Habsburg authorities. Uskoks were protected by the Pope since they paid their 
taxes on time and by the Habsburg emperors who were glad to spoil Veneto-
Ottoman peace. The Uskoks also attacked only Ottoman and Jewish ships so as 
not to offend their Christian allies. Thanks to the peace treaty with the Ottomans 
in 1574, the Venetians had to sustain the peace in the Adriatic Sea.79As the 
Uskoks continued attacking the Ottomans, the Venetians had trouble inside the 
court with the complaints of the Sultans that used these attacks as an excuse to 
obtain Venetian dominions.80  
At the end of the 16th century, the military Armada of the Venetian 
Republic was still very powerful. However, in the course of time as other 
                                                          
78
 Maurice Aymard, “XVI. Yüzyılın Sonunda Akdeniz’de Korsanlık ve Venedik,” İstanbul 
Üniversitesi İktisad Fakültesi Mecmuası XXIII/1-2. 
79
 Ibid, 223-226. 
80
 Eugenio Albèri, ed., Relazione degli Ambasciatore Veneti al Senato durante il secolo XVI, Serie 
III, vol. 2, 377. 
31 
 
Christian states, they had to use prisoners as oarsmen, because they had more 
difficulty in finding manpower from Greece and Dalmatia than they once had. 
Especially after the battle of Lepanto, they had to use men from the Habsburg 
territories and Northern Italian principalities. Thus, the 16th century corsair 
activities and the change of the Venetian military ships’ crews became important 
defects that hindered Venetian influence in the Mediterranean Sea. While 
Venetian nobles started to retreat from the sea, they rehabilitated the great Po 
valley and transformed the economic structure of the Republic. 81 
One of the breaking points in the establishment of the Venetian political 
consciousness for the Veneto- Ottoman Relations was the battle of Lepanto. 
Although the victory of Lepanto created a great enthusiasm and desire to unify 
against the Ottoman Empire for the European powers,82 the Venetians had 
different experiences in this period. While the European powers were glad to 
defeat Süleyman I’s son, the Venetians suffered from the loss of Cyprus, which 
was one of the most important Venetian dominions in the Mediterranean Sea. 
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2.3.2 Veneto-Ottoman Relations and Battle of Lepanto 
 
In 1570, with the ultimatum of Sultan Selim II, the Venetians were forced 
to leave the island to the Ottoman powers. Despite the promises of the Knights of 
Malta, the Pope Paul V and the Spanish crown, the Venetians remained alone in 
the battle initially and they had to ask for the French king Charles IX’s 
intervention during the peace negotiations. Despite the arrival of the great admiral 
Andrea Doria, the Christian powers did not save the island. Finally, the Venetians 
lost their valuable island and other Ionian islands such as Zakynthos, Cephalonia, 
and Kythira while Castelnovo and Candia were destroyed by the Ottomans.83  
After the battle of Cyprus,  Pope Paul V, the Spanish king Philip II and the 
Venetians got organized in order to avenge the Ottomans. In 1571, the European 
powers led by Carlo V’s son Don Juan de Autriche defeated the Ottoman armada 
guided by Müezzinzade Ali Pasha close to the Naupaktos near the Gulf of 
Corinth. While Europeans regarded the destruction of the Ottoman naval power as 
a great success, they did not continue with subsequent victories against the 
Ottomans. The Christian forces dissolved while dividing the battle spoils and the 
Venetians remained without allies to recover not only their physical loss but also 
their diplomatic relations inside the Ottoman court. In addition, the commerce in 
the Levant was in danger and it had to be reestablished.84 The Venetians showed 
again their capacity in diplomacy and did not lose control. Despite the bailo de 
Barbaro’s great desire to negotiate with the Ottomans; he was kept as prisoner in 
                                                          
83
 Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, vol.2 (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 
2011), 667. 
84
 Benzoni, “Il ‘farsi turco’,” 91. 
33 
 
his house in Pera.85 It was not only the bailo who was the target of the Veneto-
Ottoman tension. The Venetian merchants inside the capital were also kept in the 
house of the bailo. In return, in the hope to save the Venetian hostages, the 
Venetian Republic imprisoned the Ottoman merchants in the core of Venetian 
commerce, Rialto.86  
The Ottoman Empire was very dominant in its relations with the 
Venetians, so the bailo had to wage a psychological war inside the Ottoman 
capital. During the tension of the Lepanto war, the bailo’s house, full of Venetian 
imprisoned subjects, had to support the covering of the windows and turn the 
house into a total prison.  In short time the Ottoman laborers reopened the house’s 
windows.87 In addition, some important statesmen close to the Sultan were 
planning to attack the Venetian dominions in the Mediterranean. Koca Sinan 
Pasha wanted to organize an attack on Corfu. Ferhad Pasha had a plan to conquer 
Kotor in Montenegro, while Cicala wanted Cythera, which was the biggest of the 
Ionian islands situated in the east of Morea.88  
After the victory of Lepanto, the Venetians understood that they were not 
capable of continuing the war without the support of the European powers and 
they sought for the peace that had been tried to be established by the French 
intervention. The Ottoman Empire was not offended by the Lepanto war, on the 
contrary, they only seemed motivated. The Republic desperately had to start 
negotiations and established the peace in 1573 with two ambassadors, namely 
                                                          
85
 Bertele, Venedik ve Konstantiniyye, 108. 
86
  Preto, Venezia e I Turchi, 128.  
87
 Maria Pia Pedani-Fabris, ed. Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato. Vol. 14: Costantinopoli, 
Relazioni inedite (1512-1789), (Padua: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1996), 177- 192. 
88
 Nicolae Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, vol. 3 (İstanbul: Yeditepe, 2005),  216. 
34 
 
Marcantonio de Barbaro and Aloisio Mocenigo. The cost of European victory was 
very heavy for the Venetians. They had to leave Cyprus and Sopoto to the 
Ottomans and pay a war compensation of 300.000 Venetian ducats. Furthermore, 
the tax for the island of Zante was increased and they had to return the Ottoman 
territories occupied during the battle. 
 According to bailo Lorenzo Bernardo’s relazione dated 1590, the loss of 
Cyprus was one of the main reasons why the Ottomans did not take the Venetian 
ambassadors and bailo inside the court seriously. The Ottomans took the island 
very easily and enjoyed the booty of this significant island. Their subsequent 
tough behavior showed that they still remembered their victory. Moreover, they 
clearly saw that the Venetians were isolated and could be defeated and all their 
territories could be easily occupied. As the Venetian Republic was closer from the 
sea route, it could be an easy step to reach the universal monarchy of the Ottoman 
Empire.   
The bailo then used successful tactics to create a powerful image of the 
Republic inside the Ottoman court. According to the bailo, the Venetians had to 
reinforce all their dominions and increase the number and the quality of its ships 
inside the Mediterranean Sea and especially on the Dalmatian shores. The 
Venetians had to create an image that all Christian princes and powers would 
organize quickly when the Venetians needed their help. The Ottomans should be 
convinced that Venetians were not alone in front of the Ottoman naval power, 
which apparently realized its power for the first time. The Venetians wanted peace 
not because they had to recognize the Ottoman naval superiority, but only to take  
advantage of their presence as before. Moreover, now that the Ottoman Empire 
35 
 
was aware of its naval capacity it would not stop. So the Venetians had to create 
an image that they were still capable of defending themselves against the 
Ottomans if they wanted. Besides, as the negotiations and reputation became their 
tool to establish ties with the Ottomans, they had to stay close to the Sultan’s great 
enemy, the Spanish Empire.  The Ottoman Sultan still took his enemy seriously 
and respected them inside the court. The bailo planned to stay close to the Spanish 
not only for intelligence but also to scare the Ottomans that they could take their 
help in case it was needed. However, it was important not to become too close in 
order not to be accused of being a Spanish ally.89    
The Venetians constantly complained about not seeing the respect and 
commitment they wanted from the Ottomans. The bailo Lorenzo Bernardo 
emphasized the difficulty of negotiating with the Ottomans by an example. 
According to him, negotiating with the Ottomans seemed like playing with a 
crystal ball where one of the players threw it violently. The other neither sent it in 
the same way nor let it fall down, because in both ways the ball would be 
broken.90 If the Venetians stayed calm and did not move with timidity, they could 
find a way to negotiate. Besides, if they became as superb and ignorant as the 
Ottomans, it would only be like blowing air to the fire.91  
The last important tactic used to reinforce the Venetian image was to give 
presents to the Turkish statesmen before the negotiations, as they gave importance 
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to this also among themselves. However, one had to know that anything could be 
taken from them, without their desire and quickly. Because giving presents was a 
tradition which was organized according to one’s position inside the court. It was 
important to present the gift in the right time and place in order to take advantage 
of it92. The timing was so important that Lorenzo Bernardo regarded it as a 
medicine that could heal or accelerate  death.93 
 As we can understand from the bailos’ personal consideration, the 
Venetians, until their defeat in Cyprus, trusted in their naval power and regarded 
Ottoman presence just as a key to continue their commerce in the Levant. It seems 
that the Venetians were very offended by the Cyprus loss and subsequently tried 
to discover a cure for their wound. The Venetians were so scared of Ottoman 
expansion into the Venetian dominion that they tried to calculate the Ottoman 
Empire’s relations with its enemies. The bailo was eager to see that the Spanish 
Empire would give up negotiating with the Ottomans, as their benefits would 
clash in the Mediterranean. Moreover, he was glad that the Safavid and Hungarian 
frontiers were not calm which meant the Ottomans could not find an opportune 
time to attack the Venetians94. 
The Venetians lost an important key-stone in the Mediterranean Sea.  They 
could only protect their rights to trade in the Levant which was becoming more 
expensive over the course of time. As the Venetian Ambassador Gaspero 
Contarini pointed out in the conference of Bologna in front of the Clement II; 
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during the reign of Süleyman I “The whole of the Republic of Venice and the 
property of its subjects were in the hands of the Sultan.” After the reign of 
Süleyman their situation continued to get worse. Moreover, the Ottomans 
supported the humiliation of the European power, as did the Pope by nominating 
the Venice’s immediate desire for peace as dishonorable.95  
Actually the Levantine commerce was not as productive for Venetians as it 
once was. There were not as many merchants as before because of the taxes, 
storage expanses and money exchange. Besides, the presence of Jews in 
commerce put them in a difficult situation, as they were doing  commerce under 
the Venetian flag and with their ships, thanks to the capitulations.96 There were 
two important commerce centers for the Venetians; İzmir and Constantinople 
which were significantly affected by corsair activities, as the bailo Ottaviano Bon 
pointed out in his relazione of 1609. According to the bailo, during the long 
Ottoman wars, commerce in the port of Constantinople decreased. In addition, as 
the Sultanas became less powerful, Venetian jewelries and textiles had difficulty 
finding a place in the Ottoman market. Along with the Jews, now the English and 
French ships started to appear. Despite their occasional appearances, the market 
started to fill with different products it had not seen before such as gunpowder, 
saltpeter, sulfur. However one of the most important Venetian products, silk was 
affected by the Toscana ships which passed through Ancona, Ragusa and arrived 
in Constantinople. There were also foreign ships from the north, which smuggled  
shiny silks. According to the bailo, the Venetian Republic was the most useful 
nation for the Ottoman Empire in terms of commercial relations and labor force, 
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as the Venetian silk, velvet, wool and other expensive products were still very 
valuable. In addition to the Venetian subjects still under the protection of the 
bailo, those from the islands of Candia and Tine were working in the Ottoman 
arsenal under difficult conditions especially as caulks, carpenters or oarspersons, 
with or without payment.97 
 
 
2.3.3 Cicala’s Intervention to The Grain Problem 
 
One of main problems that the Venetian bailos faced in the Ottoman court 
was grain imports. Grain commerce with non-Muslim states had been prohibited 
since the period of Yıldırım Beyazıd. However, the Venetians and a few Italian 
states had permission to import grain at limited levels. The precautions of the 
Ottoman Empire did not block the smuggling of grains onto the Anatolian and 
Rumelian shores. Local merchants sold grains to European merchants at higher 
prices. Besides the merchants, there were also high rank members of the court that 
secretly  participated in grain smuggling.98 The Ottoman captains charged with 
sustaining the Seraglio’s grain needs participated in smuggling before returning 
back to the capital. After the first half of the sixteenth century, the grain 
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smuggling and Celali rebellions affected the Empire very negatively and caused 
famine.99 
During the presence of Cicala, Venetian bailos had difficulty in 
convincing the Sultan to sell them cereals. In the Ottoman court the trade of cereal 
was prohibited because of imperial needs, so the ruling elite in some way could 
manipulate the commerce. Beyond Cicala, due to common antipathy against the 
Venetians, the Sultan prohibited strictly the commerce not only inside the 
territories but also in the Mediterranean. Cicala had permission to control the 
grain smuggling with his corsairs that, which served as an excuse for his 
aggressive maritime activities to the Sultan. They could not control the traffic of 
cereal by staying at sea the whole year and capturing ships of various Italian 
origins. In addition, Malta and the island of Cythera came under the attack by 
Cicala, as they were important points of cereal traffic and intelligence for the 
Ottomans.100 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE PORTRAIT OF CIGALAZADE IN RELAZIONI AND DISPACCI 
 
 
3.1. Cicala’s Early Life and Family  
 
Scipione Cicala was born in Messina estimatedly between 1543 and 1548 
to a Genoese father and a converted Muslim mother as one of their three sons. His 
father Visconte Cicala, (or Cigala, Cigalla, Cicada or Çigä in Genoese dialect) 
came from a Genoese aristocratic family, which had many members such as 
cardinals, important merchants, generals and ambassadors. The Cicalas were one 
of the 28 families in Genoa which were accepted as noble by Carlo V and could 
take administrative duties by being registered to the Liber Civilitatis.101 Some 
important Genoese aristocratic families remained under the Spanish Empire’s 
aristocracy between the 16th and the 17th centuries and could expand their 
commerce to Spain, Philanders, Sardinia, Sicily, Naples and the Canaries. 
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Generally they stabilized their position in Sicily, where they could make grain 
commerce which was very scarce in the Italian peninsula as well as other military 
and political duties.102 
Visconte’s two brothers had important ecclesiastic careers. His older 
brother, Gianbattista Cicala later took the name San Clemente as a cardinal and 
became a protector of Visconte’s maritime activities.103 Visconte Cicala had his 
own ships that he used not only for corsair activities but also for commerce 
between Sicily and Spain under the banner of Sicily. After participating in the 
capture of Barberia (or Maghreb) in 1530 and the expedition of Tunisia in 1535, 
Visconte stabilized his position in Messina, Sicily as a merchant under the 
Spanish crown and was awarded for his corsair activities against the Ottomans 
and the Barbarians in the Mediterranean Sea.104 On 27 October of 1538, during 
the conquest of Montenegro (Castelnuovo) in the Balkans, Visconte Cicala 
captured the daughter of an Ottoman Bey and married her after her conversion.105 
Filippo, one of Visconte’s four sons, was in the Spanish Armada 
combatting against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. He was one of the 
founders of a religious army named Ordine Militare della Stella which cooperated 
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with the knights of Malta and to help fight against the Ottoman armada in the 
Mediterranean Sea.106 According to a poem written by Nicolo’ Colosso after 
Cicala’s attack of Reggio in 1594, Filippo had to confront his brother Scipione, 
who was defined as the new champion of the wounded Christianity and as always 
ready for battle.107 Before his carrier in the sea, Filippo was also elected senator 
three times in Messina and took other important public duties.108 It was Carlo 
Cicala, Scipione’s younger brother that took him and the Maltese knights in 
contact.109 Carlo was a merchant of slaves and a statesman in Messina inside the 
Spanish bureaucracy. He married a member of a noble family of Messina named 
Beatrice del Giudice, thus having a possibility to enter the regional aristocracy 
and by undertaking different duties he established ties with the Spanish 
aristocracy.110 The most unknown Cicala brother was Giulio who had important 
ecclesiastic duties in Genoa.111 
In 1560, the two Cicalas, Visconte and Scipione, fought during the Battle 
of Djerba in Tunisia alongside the famous Genoese Admiral Giovanni Andrea 
Doria against the Ottoman forces led by Piyale Pasha. In 1561, while waiting for 
the title of the Admiral of the Sicilian navy, Visconte and his son Scipione 
became the slaves of another famous corsair Dragut Reis.112 Dragut arrived in 
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Constantinople and Scipione was represented as a gift to Sultan Süleyman I. 
When he entered the Ottoman court, his father was imprisoned in the Prisons of 
Yedikule.113  
 
 
3.1.1 Cicala’s Conversion and Reactions 
 
As we are informed by the French ambassador inside the Ottoman court 
Antonie de Petremol, Cicala was about 17 or 18 years old114 when he was 
accepted to the court, converted to Islam and became a page of the Sultan.115 Not 
only did the conversion of Cicala capture the attention of Europe both during his 
lifetime and after his death, but also later it caused polemic among historians.  
Especially Pope Clemente VIII regarded his conversion to Islam, thus neglecting 
his original belief, as an adolescent error in his letters written to Cicala. On the 
other hand, the Pope did not lose his faith on Cicala and waited for his return not 
only to his homeland but also to his original religion.116 Pope Clement was so 
eager to realize his plans on Cicala that he even supported the position of the other 
two Cicala brothers. The Cicala brothers were not considered as total nobles 
because of being born from a converted mother. Despite their baptism and noble 
marriages, the brothers had to take the consent of Pope Clement VIII in 1596. 
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They could obtain governmental duties with this consent inside the Spanish 
Aristocracy, as the governmental duties were privileges only granted to 
Aristocracy.117 Besides in the same year the Pope accepted Cicala as a member of 
the Knights of Malta in his decree.118 In his book “Istoria della Sacra Religione et 
Militia di S. Giovanni Gierosolimitano,” Bosio, a 16th century poet who wrote 
about the Knights of Jerusalem, tried not to accuse Cicala of his conversion 
emphasizing the promise made to him in return of his father’s release from the 
prison in Constantinople, even though his father was actually already poisoned 
then.119 Moreover, Cicala’s doctor Giovanni Tommaso Minadoi of Aleppo, tried 
to explain the privileges enjoyed by Cicala in the court thanks to Sultan Selim’s 
protection, who was attracted to Cicala because of physical abilities and his 
beauty and then made him the Aga of Janissaries, the head of these military 
corps.120 According to bailo Antonio Tiepolo, Cicala was 28 years old when he 
took this duty. Despite remembering his old culture and language, he became 
contradictory to both, because he really became an “Turk.”121 As we can see from 
the Tiepolo’s observation Cicala adapted into the Ottoman administrative system 
and started to represent the Ottoman bureaucracy. In the very early periods of his 
career he started to put forward his Ottoman identity in terms of political relations.  
Even though from the European point of view Cicala’s conversion was the 
loss of a faithful brother, and although they were disturbed by the incident, they 
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also tried to understand his reasons for accepting Islam and an Ottoman Sultan’s 
domination without merely blaming him, taking into consideration his young age 
or the promise made to him. Moreover, it is clear that the conversion increased 
Cicala’s reputation and made him a focus of attention in the court and around the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
As an Ottoman convert, Cicala could represent the Ottoman Slavery 
system with the ups and downs of his career. Because of his harsh attitudes 
against the factions led by Sultan Safiye, Cicala lost his important duties many 
times, but saved himself through his marriages that brought the enormous 
protection of Sultan Süleyman I’s granddaughter and important allies made inside 
the court such as Koca Sinan Pasha. Cicala also did not hesitate to show his power 
in the Mediterranean, and became a good Ottoman statesman and representative 
of the Sultan’s authority and power outside the Imperial court. The echoes of his 
presence continued even about fifty years later of his death. A fake Mahmud as 
Cicala’s son who was accepted willingly in Europe and converted to Christianity 
created an enthusiasm.122 Moreover Nicolae Jorga points out that he became very 
Christian and took the name of Johann Michail Cicala in Polonia.123. The Papal 
State that could not convince Cicala to return to his homeland and hereditary 
religion, regarded as a victory the conversion of Cicala’s fake son. This indicates 
that Cicala was still regarded as the stolen treasure of the Europeans and even the 
return of his son to his real motherland could be a recovery for them. 
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The name Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan, which he took after his conversion, 
became significant in European circles as did the event of conversion itself. By his 
name Cigalazade, meaning the son of Cicala, the famous convert could preserve 
his father’s surname. By this way, he reminded himself of his noble origins. For 
example, Cicala showed how proud he was of his surname and family while he 
was talking to the bailo in 1598. He asked the bailo if he knew his cardinal uncle 
Cicala and took the possibility to brag about his origins.124 Preserving his original 
name and indicating it through different ways was a phenomenon inside the 
Ottoman Empire in this period. As did Cicala, other converts belonging to the 
Ottoman elite could make a reference to their origins in the court. The converts 
could show their fidelity to the Sultan thanks to their administrative or military 
successes while they apparently did remember their homeland. Gran Vizier 
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, for example, who was a Bosnian by origin, built the 
famous Drina Bridge with the caravansaray and the shops around it. Another 
famous Ottoman vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha built a mosque and a school in 
the village of Ruznik in Albania, which he specified as his original home vatan- ı 
asli in his vakifiye.125 
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3.2 Career and Networks Inside the Ottoman Court 
  
From the beginnings of his career, Cicala could always stay under the 
Sultan’s consideration and enjoy the protection of the imperial figures primarily 
through his marriages. After the successful military campaigns and conquests in 
the Eastern frontier and the Balkans, Cicala proved himself as an important 
Ottoman statesman. In order to keep the Sultan’s attention he protected his 
relations with Gazanfer Agha and Sultan Safiye, through presents adding to the 
protection of Mihrimah Sultan and Koca Sinan Pasha. 
As the Venetian bailo Marcantonio Barbaro mentioned in his relazione, 
Cicala became Kapıcıbaşı, the head of the Portieres, and received 200 aspri as 
payment which was regarded as fifty times higher for this occupation. Antonio 
Tiepolo emphasized that being Kapıcıbaşı was regarded as a privileged duty in 
this period. Cicala, in March 1574, accompanied the brother of the Moldovian 
prince named Alexandre, whose purpose was to dethrone Ioan Voda.126 
Alexandre’s intention created rebellion in the Balkans and Cicala had grand loss 
of man in the first contact. Again because of this task, Cicala was regarded as 
incapable and coward by the Venetian.127 However with the help of Tartar armies 
and the governor of Silistre, Cicala managed to suppress the rebellion with the 
addition of the Janissaries. Ioan Voda was decapitated by the governor of Silistre 
                                                          
126
 Benzoni, “Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan),” DBI, 320. 
127
 Jorga, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi, 162. 
48 
 
and all refugees of the region were pardoned for the normalization of the region. 
In 1574, Cicala entered in Constantinople victoriously.128 
Cicalazade Yusuf Sinan, in October of 1576, married the daughter of 
Vizier Ahmet Pasha (also the granddaughter of famous Mihrimah Sultan, who 
was Sultan Süleyman I’s daughter and the rich Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha’s 
wife).129 Mihrimah Sultan, possessor of enormous heritage, not only provided 
Cicala with a huge dowry including gold and valuable clothes, but also showed 
her support for him against his rivals inside the court.130 Bailo Moro also observed 
Sultan Mihrimah’s protection of Cicala against his enemies inside the court such 
as Safiye, Ferhad, Damad İbrahim or Halil Pashas who would be glad to see him 
disfavored.131 
Even though Cicala could enjoy the protection of the Sultan and Mihrimah 
Sultan, he was unexpectedly sent away from the court and became the governor of 
Bassora in 1578, because inside the capital he could not supress the rebellion of 
the Sipahis because of the rigid regulations on wine prohibition. As the Venetian 
bailo reported, Cicala lost his reputation inside the court and Cicala himself 
regarded it uncomfortable to having left her wife in the capital for a new duty 
closer to the Sultan.132  Moreover, Cicala lost his wife and thus lost his 
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opportunity to take advantages of the benefits gained through his marriage.133 
However, in 1580 Cicala was able to return to the capital in order to marry the 
sister of his deceased wife and regain his privileged position inside the court.134 
Despite the protection of Mihrimah, Cicala could not stay in the capital and he 
was sent to the Safavid frontier in 1581.135 
Ferhad Pasha, brother in law of Sultan Murad III, favored Cicala to be a 
vizier on the condition that he stayed in Revan for two years for the protection of 
the area. Ferhad Pasha’s intention with this offer was to keep his rival away from 
the Sultan’s protection. However, Cicala turned the situation to his favor by 
becoming the General of the whole army in the East. Ferhad Pasha, who was 
aware of Cicala’s lobbying against him, provoked the army in Revan and put 
Cicala’s authority in danger.136 According to bailo Morosini, Cicala was a capable 
and valuable statesman who had important moves in the Safavid wars. However 
he could never gain the trust of others because of his Italian and high born origins 
as Lorenzo Bernardo added.137 Besides bailo Giovanni Moro added that Cicala 
could make a huge fortune and reputation during the years of governing Bagdad 
thanks to his actions against the Safavid, and he could be nominated as the 
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Admiral of the Armada, if there had not been any lobbying against him. Cicala 
responded to Ferhad Pasha’s lobbying when he accepted the duty of governing the 
Castle of Erivan and the whole region around it as Vizier.  
The hostility between Cicala and Ferhad Pasha became more apparent 
during Ferhad Pasha’s arrival to the Eastern frontier. On the one hand, Ferhad 
Pasha was regarded by the army under his control as an engineer of the fortress in 
Van, thus more than a commander; on the other hand, he was disturbed by 
Cicala’s success and sharing his authority with him. Besides, Cicala was regarded 
not as capable a commander by the soldiers. However, he was chosen by Ferhad 
himself.138 Reciprocal to Ferhad Pasha’s hostility, Cicala did not regard him a 
capable general nor deserving of the position of a high commander. Therefore, 
when Cicala became the governor of Revan with the title of Vizier, he appointed 
Haydar Pasha in the position of Ferhad Pasha as a governor there.139 
According to the news arriving from Revan,140 Cicala’s armies were 
damaged without any particular defeat against the Safavid and Georgian soldiers; 
meanwhile Ferhad and Özdemiroğlu Osman Pashas, other important commanders 
of the Eastern frontier, were on their way to join him.141 Despite the devastation of 
                                                          
138
 ASVe, SDC, filza 23, fol. 62r-v (dated March 4, 1586): “Continuano più che mai le voci de 
soldati, li quali straparlano della persona di Fercat senza alcun rispetto minacciandolo nella vita, 
et stimandolo poco ben capitano uno più tosto ingegniero, dicono, che in tempo suo. che è stato in 
Persia, ha più tosto atteso a fabricar, che a combatter oltre che tra lui, et Cigala non è basta 
intelligentia et sebene da esso Ferat fu creato Bassà.” Also in Albèri, vol. 2, 344. 
139
 ASVe, SDC, filza 18, fol.149v (dated November 1, 1583). 
140
 Albèri, vol. 2, 366. As the bailo Lorenzo pointed out in his relazione (1590) Venetians were 
sharing intelligence with the Safevid Empire until 1470, the period of Uzun Hasan. Besides, they 
had a secret pact to unify against the Ottomans until 1505, so the bailo expected a possible 
cooperation with them. 
141
 ASVe, SDC, filza 20, fols. 386r-v (dated December 28, 1584): “Ne sarà la Serenità Vostra 
avisata da Revan se intende , che essendo uscito il Cigalla con buona banda di gente per far 
correrie nel paese inimico, che haveva tagliati a pezzi diversi Persiani, et Giorgiani, di che quindi 
hanno fatto grande allegrezza, ma dalle altre parte s’intende, che era seguito il contrario, perchè i 
51 
 
his army, reported as 300-400 soldiers by the bailo, Cicala took Revan and 
became its governor.142 While Cicala could save himself from the Safavid attacks, 
Özdemiroğlu Osman Pasha was injured in the battle of Van and died leaving 
Cicala as the commander of the Eastern frontier armies.143 Among the gossips 
made about Osman Pasha’s death, the worse one was that Osman Pasha died out 
of anger of Cicala’s failure, which was due to his choice of saving his brother-in-
law Hasan Pasha (the son of Ahmet Pasha) who lost many Ottoman soldiers and 
was trapped among the Safavid armies in Tabriz.144 Cicala lost not only a huge 
number of his army but also the trust of Osman Pasha by saving his brother-in-
law. Osman Pasha reminded him that the army was more important for the Sultan 
than a young man and that he was responsible for making his beard grey. Cicala’s 
attack to save his relative turned into a great embarrassment and sadness for 
him.145 
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Despite the successful attacks of Cicala against the Safavids and valuable 
interventions with his soldiers,146 after the death of Osman Pasha, he could not 
leave a good impression neither in the eyes of the Janissaries nor the Sipahis. 
During the siege of Tabriz and the establishment of an Ottoman fortress there, 
soldiers always complained about the inflation and the famine that Cicala 
preferred to ignore, and Osman Pasha’s willingness to pass the winter there, 
which Janissaries protested by cutting his pavilion’s ropes and forcing him to 
return. Besides after the conquest of Tabriz, Safavids attacked Ottoman 
headquarters, killed many governors and Pashas and robbed much of the Ottoman 
artillery. According to bailo Morosini, Safavids were aware of the turbulences and 
rebellions inside the Ottoman army and kept on their constant attacks.147 Then 
Cicala was charged with the construction of a fortress in Van to block these 
attacks. Luckily, Safavid army was not well organized and its artillery was highly 
damaged by Ottoman Sipahis and Janissaries. Besides they were not so capable of 
using the artillery that they recovered from the Ottomans.148 
During the construction of the fortress of Van, Cicala had many difficulties 
in the organization and in providing the needs of the army such as salt and wood. 
Many of the soldiers escaped or died of disease leaving their timariots without 
heirs. Cicala confiscated their territories for imperial treasury, which caused many 
rebellions. The remaining soldiers complained about the promises made to them 
about returning home after the victory of Tabriz to take a rest. Despite the 
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conquest of Tabriz, the Ottoman army was surrounded by Safavids and had 
difficulty in establishing intelligence with Constantinople.149 Contrary to the 
promises, Cicala wanted to precede his armies while the new Safavid Shah Abbas 
I took the throne in 1587 and was still trying to establish his power and organize 
his armies against the Ottomans.150 In this period, Cicala took the government of 
Bagdad, while Ferhad Pasha became the governor of Ganja in 1588.151 After the 
occupation of Nihawand and Hamadan, Cicala established fortresses in Ganja as 
ordered by the Sultan, who did not want to make peace with Safavids until the 
Ottomans fortified its boundaries.152 
In 1589, together with the governors of Tabriz Cafer Pasha and Hasan 
Pasha, Cicala sent a letter to Constantinople in order to complain about Ferhad 
Pasha’s conduct of government. According to this complaint letter, because of 
Ferhad Pasha, the armies lost the chance of taking Caspian region a few times. In 
addition, Ferhad Pasha was said to have failed to realize the needs of his 
community and was accused of stealing.153 
Along with their mutual hostility, the two generals also had different 
interpretations of the war. Gerolamo Cappello, who summarized one of the letters 
sent by Cicala in 1598, stated that the Safavids wanted to make peace, thus halting 
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their advance. Cicala also wrote in the letter that they had been fighting with the 
Safavids for 12 years, that they had killed important Safavid generals and 
captured a large amount of land from them. Accordingly, Cicala captured Fort 
Niavend and positioned himself there. Now, the Safavids demanded peace in 
order not to lose Casbin, because Fort Niavend is like a key to Casbin. Cicala, 
who did not trust the Safavids, demanded 4000-5000 soldiers in his letter so that 
even in the case of a peace agreement they could still maintain their forces there 
and fight back if the Safavids did not keep their promises. The reason of this 
distrust was that Müşid Kürdi, who was supported by the Safavid king, was 
talking of taking Fort Niavend back. Cicala commented that even this evidence 
itself showed that the Safavids were actually not willing to have peace. If they 
were not to be stopped right away, the Safavids would be more relieved to make 
the damage they would like and it would take an even bigger army to take them 
down. In order to prevent possible disorders, the frontiers needed money.154 
Cicala, as the hawkish general he was, talked about the preparation of the Safavid 
armies for a new campaign against the Ottomans and emphasized the importance 
of continuing the war against the Safavids, because he would not trust them even 
during peace time.155 On the other hand, in the letter sent to Constantinople, as 
reported by the Venetian bailo in August 1589, Ferhad Pasha was thinking of 
making peace with Safavids despite the proceeding of their armies and he also 
talked about the arrival of a Safavid group, who still had some areas between 
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Tabriz and Caspian region under their control, probably with the desire of 
peace.156 
Cicala presented a dagger covered with jewelry valued 150.000 sequins 
(Venetian gold coins) to Sultan Murad III.157 Moreover, there were gossips 
running inside the court that Cicala could be the grand admiral of the Ottoman 
armada through this very valuable gift presented to the Sultan. However, 
surprisingly Cicala was sent to Georgia because of a rebellion. Even though 
Cicala had difficulty in suppressing the rebellion because of geographical 
conditions, the Georgian King accepted to obey the Sultan; because Ferhad Pasha 
took his brother hostage and brought him in Constantinople along with many 
presents to Sultan Murad III and his wife Safiye Sultan.158 
Meanwhile, Cicala received the support of his wife’s grandmother 
Mihrimah Sultan inside the court, and through presents he tried to establish good 
relations also with Gazanfer who was originally a Venetian subject. Gazanfer was 
one of the most famous and influential statesman and a very important ally of 
Safiye Sultan, with whom he governed the most influential faction inside the 
court. Even though he was stronger in the faction he belonged, he also did not 
deny the alliance of Cicala and tried to be a mediator between him and Safiye who 
was the supporter of Ferhad Pasha.159 Memi Aga, who was a member of Cicala’s 
household, was also an important ally. He was originally a Venetian from 
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Chioggia. He married one of Hasan Pasha’s daughters. Memi Aga’s most 
powerful ally was Gazanfer who was also Cicala’s protector.160 
After his successful career in the Eastern frontier and the Balkans, Cicala 
could gather the attention of the Sultan and became the head of the Ottoman 
Armada (Kapudan-ı Derya) in 1591.161 Through this duty, he had the privilege of 
participating in the Divan (imperial counsel of the Sultan) and staying in the core 
of the Empire. Moreover, he could react quickly to gossips or lobbying made 
against him by becoming closer to the Sultan and his principal rival Grand Vizier 
Ferhad Pasha, who was always supported by Safiye. According to the English 
ambassador Lello, obtaining this title meant having a powerful network inside the 
court and being protected by the Sultan.162 As bailo Ottoviano Bon observed, the 
Admiral of the Armada was one of the most prestigious five titles of the Empire, 
along with Grand Vizier, Head of Janissaries, and Head of the Sultan’s ports and 
Treasurer. Moreover one would have high possibility of earning money and living 
comfortably, as he had control over the Arsenal and the taxing of many Ottoman 
isles in the Mediterranean.163 
We could see from the relations between Safiye Sultan, Gazanfer, Ferhad 
Pasha and Cicala that the factions inside the court relied more upon personal 
interests than the origins of the converted statesman of the Ottoman Empire. 
Safiye Sultan, who was originally Albanian and a wise and friendly ally as 
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described by the bailos, represented herself as Venetian elite and always became a 
mediator between the Ottoman bureaucrats and the Venetian bailo or 
ambassadors.164 However, she did not support Cicala, whose origin was clear even 
from his name. Moreover, Safiye’s ally Ferhad Pasha, despite being very 
supportive of the Venetian Republic,165 did not ever show sympathy to Cicala. 
In 1595, Sultan Murad III died and his wife Safiye became Valide Sultan 
(Mother Sultan) when his son Mehmed III took the throne. With the intervention 
of Safiye, who was always a rival to Cicala, Halil Pasha, Sultan’s son-in-law, 
became the new Admiral of the Ottoman Armada a year before.166 The new 
Admiral was not as capable as Cicala, according to bailo Marco Venier. However, 
his court is composed of excellent men, not rapacious like those shameless thieves 
who surrounded Cicala.167 
Cicala and Halil Pasha were very hostile to each other like a cat and a dog 
as depicted by Leonardo Dona. In order not to let Cicala to make a fortune by his 
campaigns in the Mediterranean, Halil Pasha accepted to leave the capital with the 
armada, even if staying in the capital would be more advantageous to protect his 
position inside the court.168   
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After the entitlement of Halil as Grand Admiral, Cicala offered 50000 
sequins to him and took the title of vizier after him in the court and became the 
admiral of Mar Nero Armada. However, Safiye’s intervention to the government 
and her apparent support of Halil, Koca Sinan Pasha’s supremacy and his reaction 
to this faction and finally Ferhad Pasha’s immediate destruction and decapitation 
in 1595 because of the tension between Sipahis and Janisseries, 169facilitated 
Cicala’s return.170  
In 1596, the battle of Keresztes became very significant for Cicala. In the 
battle field, Habsburg forces entered among the Ottoman pavilions and got close 
to the imperial treasure of the Sultan. As recorded by the bailo, Sultan Murad III’s 
brother-in-law Damad Ibrahim Pasha who married Sultan’s sister Sultan Ayşe, 
lost all his artillery in the hands of enemies and did not obey the commands of 
Cicala. Finally, the intervention of Cicala with the Janissaries in the end of the 
war changed the Ottomans’ fortune when the Habsburg forces were very close to 
the Sultan’s tent. Through the intervention of Hoca Sadeddin (the Sultan’s 
advisor) and Gazanfer, Cicala became Grand Vizier. The Sultan presented him a 
plume from his Turban and gifted valuable clothes.171 Despite the protection of 
Safiye, Ibrahim Pasha was disfavored by Sultan Mehmed III, who was informed 
about the Pasha’s wrong tactics on the battle field. Ibrahim Pasha lost his position 
as Gran Vizier, but remained protected by the Sultan as he wrote to his mother 
after the battle to inform her. Cicala became the target of Safiye, who could not 
                                                          
169
 According to Beyzade, Cicala and Koca Sinan provoked the soldiers against Ferhad Pasha. See 
Hasan Beyzade, Hasan Bey-zade Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004), 453-454. 
170
 Benzoni, “Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-zade Yusuf Sinan),” DBI, 328. 
171
 ASVe, SDC, filza copia 11, fol. 162 (dated November 23, 1596): “Allora il Re si trasse un 
pernacchio dal turbante et gilelo mise in testa creandolo suo primo Visir et facendolo vestir di 
ricchi vesititi.”   
59 
 
interrupt his election and was informed only by the Sultan’s letter who praised 
Cicala as the protector of his life which was given by Safiye herself.172 Cicala’s 
favorite, Eunuch Cafer was also awarded for his contribution in the defense of the 
Sultan. Cafer became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada and the Sultan’s other 
brother-in-law Halil Pasha lost his position, because of Cicala’s accusations. 
According to Cicala, Halil put many people in difficulty in the port of Navarino, 
stole many ships and loaded his own ships with grapes. Moreover, Christians sank 
some of his galleons and captured two big ones.173 When Cicala became the 
Admiral, Halil Pasha remained hostile to him and tried everything in his power to 
depose him. With Damad Ibrahim, they stood by the Venetian bailos against him 
in Mediterranean issues.174 
As it was remarked by Leslie Peirce, in addition to personal capacity and 
success, statesmen inside the court had to use different tools to empower 
themselves or their network and to weaken their rivals. These tools were a mixture 
of not only securing the support of those in higher positions, but also directly 
influencing the Sultan himself. Moreover, in this period women also had great 
influence, as Sultan Safiye was in the rise of Cicala by using her personal network 
to impact Cicala’s position. 
The governing class of the Ottoman Empire in this period operated 
not so much on the basis of institutionally or functionally ascribed 
authority as through a complex of personal bonds and family and 
household connections. Functionally ascribed authority -authority 
devolving from one’s office certainly existed, but more important was the 
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web of individual relations of patronage and clientage, of teacher and 
student, of kinship and marriage- that brought one to that office and that 
one used in the exercise of one’s official power. Men as well as women 
sustained their careers by means of such networks, and men and women 
played significant roles in the formation of each other’s network.175 
 
However, after the battle of Keresztes, in order to control the army, Cicala 
took a census and confiscated the timars (grants of land revenue) and goods of the 
escaped soldiers, and decapitated the rebelled soldiers including an important 
general Yusuf Aga, who was made to wear women clothes to the Pasha of Aleppo 
in front of the Army. Besides the Khan of Crimea, Gazi Giray was deposed, 
because of his late arrival to the battle field. Cicala’s rigid precautions for the 
army’s reorganization provoked soldiers more and created new rebellions until the 
Anatolian timariots.176 Moreover, Cicala kept on putting Venetians in difficulty in 
the Mediterranean and the bailo inside the court. He blocked the fishing boats in 
Butrinto located in Albania, attacked ships that help Uskoks, supported corsairs 
against Venetians and gave them license for their activities. The bailo had 
difficulties in saving Venetian subjects imprisoned by Cicala. Because of the 
Spanish navy sailing close to Zante and Corfu, Cicala blamed Venetians of spying 
for the Spanish crown and did not facilitate issues about Venetian slaves.177 
Damad Ibrahim Pasha was an important ally of Sultan mother Safiye and 
an important favorite since the period of Selim II inside the court. He was 
originally from Schiavonia, close to Ragusa, located in Croatia. According to 
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bailo Bernardo, he used to graze animals before entering in Seraglio.178 Ibrahim 
was also protected then by Murad III and Mehmed III, because he married the 
daughter of Selim II and Nurbanu. When Damad İbrahim married his sister, 
Sultan Murad III presented many gifts for his sister and then supported his sister’s 
husband during his reign.179 In fact, Damad Ibrahim was not regarded as a 
capable, intelligent statesman by the Venetians and other bureaucrats inside the 
court. He obtained this high rank just because he married a Sultana.180    
Safiye did not lose time to protect her family and put an end to the grief of 
her husband’s sister resulting from his disfavored husband Ibrahim Pasha. In the 
court, Safiye and his sister-in-law formed a great opposition against Cicala who 
was not expected to keep his title long, as reported by Gazanfer’s brother-in-law 
Halil Aga. Meanwhile, the Sultan returned to Transylvania instead of coming 
back to the capital directly after the campaign of Egri. Safiye accused Cicala of 
keeping Sultan away from her in order to block her influence on him.181 
Inevitably Cicala lost his position as vizier only after a month to Ibrahim 
Pasha.182 Sultan Safiye sent letters to his son instead of waiting for him to return 
blaming Cicala of his hatred to dethrone Ibrahim Pasha, even to kill him to take 
his position. Safiye revealed her fear that any harm would come to Ibrahim who 
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was very much loved by people because of his kindness and success.183 However, 
Gran Vizier Ibrahim had to support insults of Cicala, besides the insult offered by 
the King through Cicala’s retention of the sword of honor and the imperial 
letters.184 
It was not only Cicala himself who was affected by Safiye’s revenge. Lam 
Ali Çelebi, who was a financial director in Anatolia became chancellor after 
Cicala’s rise, but lost his title only three months later because of supporting 
Cicala’s grand vizierate. Lam Ali also had written the official victory 
announcement for the battle of Keresztes, praising Cicala’s valuable contribution 
to the victory and named the Sultan as the conqueror of Egri.185 However, the 
famous chronicler Naima pointed out that Peçevi,186 another important chronicler 
and a witness of the period, found the importance of Cicala in the battle also so 
exaggerated.187 Moreover, another chronicler Beyzade pointed out that while the 
Ottoman army was nearly destructed Cicala fled near the Tatar soldiers while the 
Habsburg army was on the point of destroying the Sultan’s tent. In order to 
protect him, all household of the Sultan such as cooks and camel drivers had to 
fight against them and saved Sultan Mehmed III.188 However, chronicler Selaniki 
regarded Cicala’s presence very valuable in the battle and defended him.189 Hoca 
Sadeddin, who was not very friendly to the Sultan Mother,190 and Gazanfer also 
lost their value and was disfavored by the Sultan as important allies of Cicala’s 
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network after his dismissal.191 After the dismissal of Cicala, members of his 
faction were so frustrated that they rumored that the women were governing the 
Empire and leading it to destruction. Cicala would prefer to go to pilgrimage to 
Mecca and pray for the conservation of the Muslim population instead of seeing 
the collapse of the Empire.192 
In 1599, Cicala returned to Constantinople and claimed for his son the title 
of Kadı of Greece (judge according to Sharia) through the gifts presented to Halil 
Pasha, the governor of the capital. Cicala kept on his admonitory rotations around 
Navarino, Lanciano, the gulf of Squillance and Stilo, and the strait of Messina in 
Southern Italy as the Admiral. He also captured two Ragusan ships full of grain 
and people and a small ship full of Calabrian salami going to Sicily.193 
The religious and economic regulations of Spanish and local authorities,  
became so harsh for Southern Italian subjects that Cicala’s intervention to the 
situation there received a good respond despite the terror and hatred he created as 
an Ottoman figure. In 1599, Murad Reis, the commander of the galleons under 
Cicala had secret negotiations with Maurizio Rinaldi, a Venetian resident in 
Napoli, as reported by a Calabrese convert. Besides, also Tommaso Campanella, 
famous religious man and author against the Spanish authorities had some 
connections with Cicala that one of his companions escaped to Constantinople 
and was protected by Cicala after a rebellion in Calabria, Sicily.194 Cicala’s 
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attitude to the Spanish in the Mediterranean was so clear. According to the 
Spanish ambassador in the court in 1599, all the money and Catalan slaves of 
some French ships in Scio were captured by Cicala, but returned back to the 
French ambassador. However, the ambassador was not able to compensate 
anything.195    
On the Italian side, the constant conflict of the Ottomans against the 
Habsburgs in Europe and Safavids in the East, the turbulences of Sipahis in 
Anatolia and in Constantinople took the attention of Pope Clement VIII, who 
interpreted these as the symptoms of the decline of the Ottoman power. The pope 
who was always willing to organize a crusade against the Ottomans, sent Cicala’s 
cousin, Antonio to the Spanish Emperor to convince him for negotiations with 
Cicala in return of some territories of the Ottoman Sultan to return him to 
Christianity and destroy the Ottoman Empire, thanks to his cooperation and the 
crusade powers. However, Clement VIII could not realize his plans.196 
In 1601 Cicala was in Negroponte as the admiral of the navy, which was 
composed of 37 galleons, three of which were armed. As reported by the bailo, 
Cicala was waiting for the joining of his son to his forces who was the Pasha of 
Damasco and other galleons. Despite sending his ten galleons to accompany the 
Pasha of Cairo, Cicala would not hesitate to attack the Spanish army with less 
than sixty ships. In this period, Cicala was self-confident and thought that even his 
name could scare his enemies. Even in 1598, the Venetian Ambassador Francesco 
                                                          
195
 ASVe, SDC, filza 49, fol. 371v: “Alla quale … si duevano, che erano stati restituiti 
all’Ambasciatore tutti li denari, et schiavi Catellani presi dal Cigala a Scio sopra la nave 
francese, et insieme tutto lo resto de schiavi sudditi di questa Maestà, il che in effetto non fu mai 
esequito.” 
196
 Montuoro, “I Cicala,” 292. 
65 
 
Sorenzo in Spain said that the sailing of the Turkish fleet made Spain fear to 
expose the shores of Italy to an attack from Cicala.197 
 Cicala also became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada in 1601, thanks 
to the Şeyhülislam Hoca Sadeddin. The Sultan trusted his adviser Sadeddin who 
ensured that Cicala could improve the Ottoman Army and block the Christian 
armies in the sea, as he did in the battle field.198 Cicala’s rigid attitude against the 
Venetians continued in this period. The governor of the Santa Maura Mustafa Bey 
was one of the corsairs that put the Venetians in difficulty. The Venetians were 
tired of Cicala’s attitude. When there was rumor that he got dysentery, the bailo 
reported that if God permitted his death, any admiral that took the position of 
Cicala could be worse than him.199 In order to protect the Venetians, the Sultan 
ordered to burn all corsair ships and leave free the hostage Venetian subjects. 
According to the Sultan’s imperial letter, the ships close to Santa Maura were not 
permitted to arm. According to bailo’s intelligence, the Spanish armada was 
trying to reinforce his dominions in Africa. As Cicala’s surveillance passed to the 
Santa Maura, their passage became easier. However, Cicala was trying to pass 
with his army through Calabria and Puglia. Cicala was expected to meet the 
Spanish armada in the Mediterranean. He had an imperial command on his hand 
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that warned the Spanish army to disarm in the Ottoman domains in Africa. 
However, the Ottoman court was not very eager of this Ottoman-Spanish 
interaction. Şeyhülislam was very glad that Cicala did not sail with the Imperial 
armada and the court members expected that the Bostancıbaşı would become the 
new Admiral of the Ottoman Armada. As the bailo said, when the Bostancıbaşı 
talked   negatively about Cicala, the Sultan disapproved him.200 Despite the 
court’s fear of encountering with the Spanish Armada in Africa that aimed to 
conquer Algiers and Tunisia according to the intelligence, Cicala did not have to 
worry. The Spanish could not realize their goals, because the Venetian Republic 
did not ally with them.201 Although Venetians were very disturbed about Cicala’s 
attitudes and his protection of the corsairs, he was unluckily the supreme authority 
to solve the corsair issues.202 Besides, Cicala sometimes gave promises to the 
bailo to resolve his problems. He sometimes appeared more willing to protect the 
peace between the Venetian Republic and the Ottoman Empire, but he behaved 
contrarily. Other times, he could talk about everything such as Cristian princes or 
theology without giving permission to the bailo for making his statement. The 
bailo always complained about Cicala’s double face on important issues and he 
did not let Cicala deceive him. When Cicala sailed in the Mediterranean, he even 
assured that he would not disturb the Venetian dominions, but the bailo regarded 
his surveillance as a treat to the Venetian Republic.203 
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When the Ottoman army lost Transylvania and some other important 
castles after 1600, the court started to organize festivals to suppress the tumults 
and confusions due to the Hungarian campaign. The Sultan was blamed of not 
knowing anything about the ongoing war and not leading the war himself. He was 
so unaware of the situation he would be shocked if some Sipahis or Janissaries 
demanded the decapitation of some court members. Cicala’s name started to be 
pronounced as the leader of the Ottoman army in Hungary. However, the court 
could neither tell the Sultan to lead the war himself nor could they convince him 
to send Cicala.204 As the bailo added, Cicala did not volunteer in leading the 
Ottoman Army in Hungary even as a Gran Vizier, because being the Admiral of 
the Armada was more secure even if the title was not as high. If he was promoted 
as the Gran Vizier, he would find a way to escape the position.205 It was not only 
Cicala who tried to escape from this hard duty. Even the Sultan’s brother-in-law 
Ibrahim Pasha was trying to return to the capital as a governor. Even if both 
statesmen were nominated as the supreme authority in the Hungarian campaign, 
neither of them wanted to be away from the capital and take the responsibility for 
defeats. Cicala was even content with going to the Black Sea in order to avoid 
going to Hungary. He was willing to go, even if there were only 10 ships ready. 
Of course, his only purpose was not to avoid Hungary but also to fill his pocket.206 
Moreover, Cicala was very smart in the incident that when the Sultan charged him 
to organize a Divan with Şeyhülislam and Halil Pasha to discuss next year’s war 
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issues, he told that he was not a statesman but a simple marine. He would only 
advise to follow the Islam Law and the Canon.207     
In this period of his career, he made his last successful movement and 
supressed the rebellion of the Sipahis and saved his ally Gazanfer in 
Constantinople. By the successful intervention of Cicala and important religious 
authorities and Seyh’ul Islam, the negotiations were made in the Santa Sofia and 
Gazanfer was saved and gave the timars in proportions that Sipahis wanted.208 
Safiye showed her gratefulness by sending a very affectionate letter to Cicala, 
which was regarded artificial also by the bailo himself. Safiye nearly apologized 
for her aggressive behaviors towards Cicala until now, because she was always 
badly informed about him. Then on, contrary to her behaviors before, she would 
be only beneficial to him.209 Cicala took the support of the Queen Mother in the 
court, for the first time in his life and increased his reputation among the court 
elite. Besides, Sultan Mehmed III showed more affection and approval towards 
Cicala than other ministers, who suppressed the rebellion.210 Gazanfer was also so 
grateful to him that he became more supportive than before, because Cicala was 
one of the few ministers, who still stood beside him.211  
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Cicala took advantage of the protection of Sultan and his mother Safiye 
and tried to make his son the Beylerbey of Damasco. Because of his young age 
and dismissal of an experienced old governor without excuse, there were rumors 
against Cicala. Thanks to the Queen Mother’s support, Cicala could buy the title 
by paying less than 150 sequins. Moreover, he was planning to marry his son to 
the Sultan’s daughter or one of his sisters and make him a vizier promising him to 
take advantage of his authority and his fortune.212 However, as the Admiral of the 
Empire, Cicala had many difficulties. He tried to expand his army despite 
financial difficulties and kept on forming alliances with the corsairs such as Kürt 
Çelebi, who accompanied him in Maghreb. There was also Murad Reis that 
helped the negotiations in Calabria against the Spanish, despite his discontent 
about sharing the booty even when Cicala did not participate. With the 
intervention of Yemişçi Hasan Pasha, arsenal workers could not take their 
payments. For the construction of new galleons, there were not enough wood.213 
Cicala was also always complaining about the disorder inside the Empire to the 
Sultan. As the bailo reported, because of the opium that he used, he was always 
discontent and grumbling. Safiye Sultan was so disturbed that she wrote a letter to 
warn him. According to her, instead of exaggerating the situation and disturbing 
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his son unnecessarily, he should have been the Grand Vizier, if he had known 
better.214 
In this period, Gazanfer was very powerful inside the court. He was close 
to the Sultan and kept enjoying Safiye’s support. Besides, he could take the 
support of his family, such as his sister Beatrice in Harem and her husband Çerkez 
Ali Aga as well as other allies. As reported by bailo Contarini, Gazanfer was the 
main actor to negotiate with ambassadors for the yearly payments, as he did with 
the Venetian bailo.215 He was so influential that he was regarded as a real 
governor of the Empire.216 On the other hand, The Sipahis sent to the Hungarian 
campaign were not content about their condition. In 1601, about 500 Sipahis 
visited Şeyhülislam to declare their complaints. They were economically in 
difficulty because of the constant wars. Although the decimal of the timars was 
increased, they complained about the Avarız that Cicala collected. According to 
the soldiers, Cicala was supposed to use it for artillery or the Armada, but he did 
not. They also complained that upper class pashas who did not come to war or 
were not allowed, had timars.217 Timariots in the compaign were so aggressive 
that they burnt the tent of the General Commander and decapitated the 
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Defterdar.218 During the Hungarian campaign, many soldiers returned in very bad 
condition without their proper clothes, armies and horses. As some of them 
declared during their participation in Divan, they had to eat bad bread that they 
had to share with their horses and camels. The food was also defected and the 
army was damaged. Besides, the French soldiers who accompanied the Ottoman 
army could easily have titles and changes, as one of them could become the 
Sancak Bey of Salamadria, in Belgrade.219 As the soldiers declared, the General of 
the army had to control different parts of the army as his lieutenant could not 
govern subdivisions. For the disorder inside the army, Gazanfer Aga, Sultan 
Mother Safiye and Şeyhülislam were seen as responsible.220 Besides, the Sultan 
had difficulty in financing the army for the next year of the Hungarian war. As the 
bailo reported, now more money started to enter to the Imperial treasure from the 
Arsenal than it did before. However, Cicala also had difficulty in helping find 
additional source for the treasure as the taxes collected were already consumed. In 
order to find the money, they appointed government officers to the treasury and 
they contacted the former tax collectors, who controlled Constantinople’s income 
and expenses. 
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Accordingly, expenses increased to 100.000 sequins per year. In order to 
find a solution to this, they had meetings with three different tax collectors in four 
days. The right to collect taxes was granted to whoever could collect more taxes. 
This system did not allow the tax collectors to work on a fixed salary. However, 
these officers knew how to take advantage of this situation by acting as tyrants.221     
Gazanfer tried to suppress the complaint of the head of the Sipahis through 
valuable gifts or in different ways, but when the General and all army arrived, the 
tumult became greater. The 200 Sipahi soldiers from Anatolia also complained in 
the Divan for the compensation of their loss. They served for the sake of the 
religion and the Sultan and put their life in danger and suffered. While they were 
expecting something in return, they found their families abducted, their territories 
harmed and the roads blocked.222 Also some members of the bread makers from 
Bursa arrived in Scutari in order to see Gazanfer and warn the Sultan that in fact 
rebels were close to him that prevented him from understanding the real danger. 
The city of Bursa wanted to show his fidelity and help the Sultans against the 
rebellions. As the bailo mentioned the bread of the Court was sent from Bursa. 
Now that there were uprisings in Bursa, they only wanted to send the bread of the 
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Sultan, not to different parts of the Seraglio which arrived to the table of 
Gazanfer.223 
Despite the efforts to suppress the uprisings of the Sipahi, the court could 
not escape from rebellious soldiers’ demand for Gazanfer’s head. Sultan Mother 
and the Chief White Eunuch were seen as the main reason of tumults in Anatolia 
and disorder in the Army. Besides, he was very close to Sultan Mehmed III and 
Sultan Safiye that both prevented him from seeing the turbulences inside the court 
and Anatolia.224  
In January of 1603,225 Mehmed III had to listen to the moans of the 
rebelled soldiers in the public Divan. In Seraglio, Janissaries in the Bedesten and 
in public areas kept their position. 300 more Janissaries were charged in the prime 
cortile of the Seraglio and had to close the doors in any great tumult. The Sultan 
was accompanied by Kadıasker, Aga of Janissaries, and the Şeyhülislam with 
some Janissaries and Sipahis that promised to protect him against rebels. As 
reported by bailo Francesco Contarini, 10 Janissaries and Sipahis representing 
rebellious soldiers complained about the wars and territories lost in Asia and 
Hungary. Besides, they were very disturbed about his mother’s interventions to 
politics, which caused more chaos. They demanded from the Sultan to send her 
away from Constantinople.226 The Sultan did not let them talk about his mother 
and dishonor himself, but promised to keep her away from politics. When they 
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insisted on Gazanfer’s execution, Murad III tried to apply justice through Islamic 
law, but Rebels reminded of him the execution of all his brothers and gave him 
three days threatening to dethrone him. Despite Gazanfer’s demand for 
forgiveness and the Sultan’s promises to give benefits, finally Gazanfer got 
undressed of his satin white dress and got beheaded in front of Sultan Mehmed III 
in January 1603. 
According to bailo Contarini, Gazanfer was regarded the closest advisor of 
the Sultan who always satisfied him with his services and did not deserve such an 
end. Before he was executed, he had served for 22 years to the Ottoman court and 
became very close to the last emperors Murad III and Mehmed III as the head of 
all Eunuchs and the imperial ports. Although he knew the risks of his duty, 
because of the Sultan’s affection towards him, he could not leave his duty. 
Moreover, Gazanfer made great fortune during the reign of the last two emperors 
and had the opportunity to intervene in the decision making of Sultan Mehmed III 
through the Arz letters. The Sultan always asked him what he demanded and to 
write his desire. Everything he said was written without repetition.227 Moreover, 
Gazanfer was known as the Sultan’s müsahip, his protégé, without whom any 
decision was not made in the court.228 However, he was so intelligent and capable 
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that he did not directly show his effect on the Sultan’s decision making. 229After 
the execution of Gazanfer, the Aga of Harem, who was very close to the Sultan 
Mother, was also decapitated. As the bailo declared, Sultan Murad was very sad 
about the decapitation of his beloved friend. He was also very sorry about not 
finding any solution to prevent it. He showed his grief though his tears as he was 
beating his knees.230 
Meanwhile, Cicala could not escape from the Safavid wars and was sent to 
the Eastern frontier as the head of the Ottoman armies and his career started to 
decline during the reign of Ahmed I. The Safavid army under the command of 
Shah Abbas started to take an offensive position in the beginning of the 17th 
century. The Safavid King received the support of some Kurdish tribes and four 
Georgian princes that rebelled against the Ottoman administration. The Safavid 
armies were accompanied by many Ottoman fugitive soldiers from Anatolia. 
Besides, the new Safavid started to give importance to intelligence with the 
Christian kings in order to disturb their common enemy, namely the Ottoman 
Empire. In 1603, Shah Abbas recovered Tabriz, Genge, Demirkapı, Servan, 
Revan, Tiflis, and besieged Erivan, the capital of Armenia. As the bailo reported, 
more than 160.000 Ottoman soldiers were lost and 150 pieces of artillery were 
destroyed. The Safavids put the Ottomans in difficulty in Erzurum. Moreover, 
Cicala could not take help for his army, because many soldiers were sent for the 
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Hungarian campaign and to block rebellions in Anatolia.231 Even the recruitments, 
the help of powerful Kurdish forces and militias of Damascus and Aleppo could 
not save Cicala then. In 1606, Cicala died in Diyarbakir, where he escaped for his 
son’s help and had to watch the destruction of the Ottoman army despite his 
supreme authority.232  
Because of Cicala’s rigid regulations and movements according to the 
deserts from the army, the rebellions inside the Ottoman army increased. The 
soldiers under Cicala attacked his tent complaining about his actions for personal 
interests. While he was in the Eastern campaign, he was blamed to visit his son 
Mahmut, who was the Pasha of Damasco.233 While he was in the Mediterranean, 
he tried to see his mother.234 
The Ottoman army was increased in number in order to supply the need of 
soldiers in different frontiers. However, because of the delays in payments, the 
number of rebelled soldiers in Anatolia also increased. The execution of 
Canbuladoğlu Hüseyin Pasha, the governor-general of Aleppo and the most 
powerful commander in northern Syria, was the most significant incident in the 
Eastern frontier. In addition to Canbuladoğlu, there were also other Ottoman 
soldiers who had important titles inside the army. For example, after the execution 
of his uncle, Canbuladoğlu Ali Pasha rose in revolt to protest the situation and in a 
short time Canbuladoğlu’s rebellion became the most challenging problem for the 
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Ottoman Army and the Sultan.235 Ali Pasha was united with the other principal 
leaders of Syria against the Ottomans. Besides he was in continuous network with 
other famous rebel leaders that were once Ottoman soldiers, namely Kalenderoğlu 
and Said Arab in central Anatolia. There was also Yusuf Pasha, who rebelled 
against the Ottoman authority, who was once a tax collector in Asia Minor, 
Magnesia. 
As the bailo Ottoviano Bon observed, because of the rebellions in 
Anatolia, the population there started to desolate their homeland. The cities and 
provinces became ruined and uncultivated. The Empire had difficulty in 
convincing the ex-habitants to turn back to their homeland. The ones that survived 
the attack of the rebellions started to translocate to Uskudar, Pera and 
Constantinople. Despite their bad condition, they had no desire to return to 
Anatolia.236    
Moreover, Şeyhülislam and other religious authorities wrote a letter to the 
Sultan in order to charge Cicala with the duty of suppressing the rebellion in 
Aleppo, which affected the commerce and was known to Bursa. According to the 
bailo’s letters, Cicala did not have more than 25 galleons. Many of his soldiers 
were sent to his homeland because of the payment problem. The remaining ones 
were not capable soldiers in using the artillery. Cicala was sent in Alessandria just 
in order to take the Imperial treasure of 600.0000 sequins,237 so he did not have 
the intention to damage his reputation by attacking rebels in this condition. He did 
not also have the courage to attack them where he was not considered as an 
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effective commander. Cicala waited in Rodi for the return of his soldiers, who 
were sent to Alessandria (İskenderiye). In this period as emphasized by the bailo, 
Cicala was losing his authority in the Mediterranean.238 However, when Cicala 
wrote an Arz to the Sultan, he told that he could not go to Alessandria because of 
the wind.239 Besides he was still not careful about his movements in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Gazanfer was one of his allies who was very disturbed and 
angry about his reactions despite his warnings inside the court as reported by 
bailo Contarini.240 When Cicala sent an army of 17 galleons to sustain the need of 
bread for the Janissaries from Salonika, a great ceremony for the amry’s entrance 
to Constantinople was prepared. The Sultan himself also observed the entrance of 
the army. By this way, Cicala could cover his unsuccessful attacks in Calabria, 
southern Italy. However, Gazanfer who was aware of his actions in the 
Mediterranean complained about Cicala, who lost his 500 men while 
unnecessarily taking his revenge.241  
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Another important behavioral change came from the Sultan’s advisor Hoca 
Sadeddin. In 1599, when Cicala was very powerful as the Ottoman Admiral in the 
Mediterranean Sea, Hoca Sadeddin criticized Cicala’s aggressive attitude against 
Venetians that were the Empire’s allies. Like Gazanfer, also Hoca Sadeddin was 
favorable towards Venetian issues as was the Sultan.242 Sadeddin was very bored 
of Cicala that he did not hesitate to criticize him in front of Cicala’s enemy Halil 
Pasha. As the bailo witnessed, Hoca Sadeddin was very angry that the Empire’s 
dignity depended on Cicala’s temper. Koca Sinan Pasha who was not favorable 
about Cicala’s nomination as Kapudan in 1591, then changed his idea in terms of 
his relations with him. In his two telhis, Koca Sinan apparently did not support 
Cicala’s nomination of Admiral.243 Besides, when the Sultan asked about Cicala, 
he said that he was using opium. However, Koca Sinan later became his supporter 
especially against Ferhad Pasha whom he was very hostile.  
Actually in this period Hoca Sadeddin and Cicala supported each other 
with Gazanfer. However, when Cicala showed behaviors that damaged the 
Empire’s interests, Sadeddin did not see any harm to criticize him apparently. 
Again, we can see that when the interests of the men in the same faction met, the 
alliances changed.244  
Actually it would be very naive to think that Hoca Sadeddin would worry 
only about the maintenance of the Empire, because here there were also personal 
interests. When Sadeddin’s son became the Kadı of Rumeli, Cicala sent his 
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Defterdar in order to celebrate him. However, Sadeddin found him very insincere 
and accused Cicala of supporting a very old and unnecessary man instead of his 
son during the election. The Defterdar of Cicala tried to convince him that Cicala 
only thought the government’s benefit. Cicala was very sorry that the Sultan was 
not very supportive towards him these days. However, the Defterdar could not 
convince Sadeddin. Besides the Sultan’s advisor was very disturbed about 
Cicala’s aggressive attitudes towards the Empire’s friends, namely the Venetians. 
Sadeddin found fairer to support the Empire’s friends, benefits and its old 
traditions. Despite saying that he followed the regulations of Sultan Süleyman I, 
Cicala was not very friendly in politics. Hoca Sadeddin would have regarded him 
more sincere if he supported the Empire’s dignity and benefits as he did. He was 
aware of the Venetians’ complaints about Cicala’s enslavement of four Venetians 
which was only the last one among others and the destruction of their ships. 
Besides, Cicala’s exaggerated support for the corsairs was known in the court. He 
made the passage of the corsair ships in Constantinople possible and put everyone 
in danger. The corsairs were uncontrollable now and the Sultan did not take 
advantage of their presence. Moreover, his allies were constantly disturbed. As the 
bailo reported, Sadeddin was so angry that he said even the Sultan would take 
Cicala’s head, if he had known what was really going on.245 
Hoca Sadeddin was very disturbed about Cicala’s visits to his family in 
Italy, as a Turkish Muslim descendant and the member of Ulema class. Cicala was 
criticized about using the Armada for his own interests. However, it is very 
significant that even one of his supporters criticized him about his visits to the 
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family. According to Hoca Sadeddin, Cicala should not have visited her mother 
who converted to Christianity. Moreover, he let her mother return back to his 
house. With these behaviors, Cicala offended God, refused the Sharia and he 
should have been punished.246  
In fact, Gazanfer and Cicala were good allies despite supporting different 
factions. While Safiye was always hostile to Cicala, because of his parental ties 
with Halil, Ferhad and Ibrahim Pashas, Gazanfer did not stand against Cicala with 
her.  For example, he was one of the main supporters of Cicala after the battle of 
Haçova to make him Gran Vizier. He had to take the risk of being disfavored by 
the Sultan because of exaggerating Cicala’s successes during the battle with Lam 
Ali and Hoca Saadeddin. In return Cicala protected Gazanfer and saved him from 
losing his head in the great Sipahi revolt of 1601 in Constantinople. Although we 
can see clearly alliances in important situations, we cannot consider them constant 
and rigid. As we can see from Gazanfer’s behaviors, different alliances among 
different factions were possible. For example, Safiye’s hatred to Cicala could not 
block Gazanfer’s cooperation with him. Besides, despite supporting Cicala, 
Gazanfer did not hesitate to complain to the Sultan about his activities in the 
Mediterranean.  
When the members of the same factions could not be useful to each other, 
their cooperation could be easily interrupted and continue under different 
conditions and times. For instance, after the Sipahi revolt of 1601, Safiye could 
easily see that how his great ally Gazanfer became the target of hatred in the eyes 
of Sipahis and Janissaries. In order to protect her position and faction, she had to 
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let Cicala move on to the same side with them. When Cicala and Seyh’ül Islam 
suppressed the revolt, she showed the approval of Cicala’s entrance to her faction 
by a very friendly letter sent to him. 
 
 
3.3 Relations with the Republic of Venice  
 
Despite their constant efforts for friendship, Venetians were always 
uncomfortable about Cicala’s attitudes inside the court and in the Mediterranean. 
Matteo Zane told in his relation many interesting details about Cicala, which was 
read in the Senate of the Venetian Republic in 1594. Zane described Cicala as a 
powerful and capable statesman who was aware of his advantages gained through 
his parental ties, and gained with marriages by two grand daughters of Rustem 
Pasha, who was husband of Mihrimah. For example, he did not even hesitate to 
consume opium in public areas or wine which was prohibited by laws.247 
For Venetians, even if being rich, Cicala was very gready that the bailo 
had to present 500 sequins in total, in his primary contacts with him.248 In addition 
to the expenses made for Cicala, bailo drew a negative picture of him meaning his 
huge greed, desire to gain more and habit of lying and cheating. According to 
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him, these were why Cicala was the most hated among the other statesmen of the 
Sultan.249 
As Cicala had a crucial intervention in the decision making of the Sultan 
over cancelling or passing licenses, bailo could not do differently. According to 
the bailo, if the Sultan did not declare efficient commands for the Venetian 
Republic, it was not because he did not want to or the bureaucrats were incapable. 
It was only duty to Cicala’s bad intention towards Venetians.250 Besides, the bailo 
was scared of complaining about Cicala’s activities inside the court with fear of 
the possibility of Cicala lobbying against him. As he could easily reach the Sultan, 
anything bad could happen to the bailo.251 Moreover, Cicala did all his activities 
in the Mediterranean in the name of the Sultan and informed him at the very last 
minute about his maritime activities that Venetians had difficulty in opposing. 
According to bailo Cappello, Cicala was very comfortable in the Mediterranean 
issues, because he promised the Sultan that every time he sailed he would do 
everything to offend the Spanish King whom the Sultan hated.252 Besides his 
unpredictable activities, Cicala’s attitude about the corsairs that attacked Venetian 
dominions changed from time to time. During his campaign through Montenegro, 
Cicala punished corsairs who attacked the Venetian dominions such as Santa 
Maura, Corfu and Zante. After this attitude, the bailo asked Cicala’s help to block 
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some other corsair activities, but he could not get any response. According to the 
bailo, Cicala’s only aim was to expand his campaign to his motherland 
Montenegro, where his mother who was the daughter of the region’s governor, 
was captured by Cicala’s father.253 In addition, some corsairs could conduct their 
activities under Cicala’s protection. When Cicala became the Admiral of the 
Ottoman Armada in 1598, some Reis under him who supported his entitlement as 
admiral, threatened the bailo that now it was their time to take revenge from the 
Venetians.254 In 1599, a famous corsair named Deli Ali could take from Cicala the 
permission of arming five ships in Santa Maura. Deli Ali captured a Venetian ship 
Silvestra, attacked many other ships and harmed the Venetians inside the ships. 
Despite the complaint letters sent to the Sultan and the support of Gazanfer and 
Vezir Halil Aga, the bailo could not stop the corsair Deli Ali. He even tried to 
convince Gazanfer who helped Cicala to arm his galleons to give up supporting 
him in his activities. In order to mediate with Cicala, the bailo always tried to take 
advantage of Gazanfer’s friendship. However, Venetians could not recover their 
ships nor the Venetian subjects imprisoned by another corsair Arnavut Memi.255 
When Cicala captured other three Venetian ships and totally destructed them, he 
was apparently accompanied by all his men in five ships whose head was Deli 
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Ali.256 The bailo regarded Cicala’s activities very cruel and could not secure the 
situation for the Venetian galleons in the Mediterranean, as Cicala was becoming 
more aggressive, as were his corsairs.257 According to bailo Cappello, Hoca 
Sadeddin and other important statesman of the Port agreed that Cicala went for 
sailing like a corsair rather than a General of the Ottoman Armada. 258 Cicala was 
very untrustworthy that even when he became kind, the bailo did not believe in 
him.259 Moreover, when the corsair Deli Ali was captured in 1600, Cicala released 
him and gave him the license to sail. The famous corsair kept on being a trouble 
for the Venetian dominions in the Mediterranean.260       
Cicala could find the way to present booty for the Sultan to keep on 
enjoying his protection who gave him the title of grand admiral even if in the 
court Cicala was not considered as a suitable man for this charge. Besides, he had 
a wide espionage network that the bailo warned many times about Cicala’s 
possible aggressive maritime and territorial activities.261 When Cicala was 
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conducting his maritime activities, Messina, where he was born, was under 
Spanish authority and was not very friendly to the Republic of Venice. So, Cicala 
did not have any motivation to favor the Venetian benefits inside the court. 
Sometimes he was behaving so cruel to the bailo in his conversations with him. 
He did not even hesitate to have disturbing talks with the bailo about his 21 
Venetian slaves in his private bathroom.262   
As the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada, Cicala was paid 40.000 sequins 
for a year and became also the governor of some islands in the Mediterranean Sea 
and did not lose his title as Vizier. Cicala had to spend 200.000 sequins and so 
according to the bailo Zane he would be so willing to recover this through his new 
duty.263 As reported by the main dragoman Bernardo Rossi, Cicala exploited not 
only the ministers under him, but also the Mediterranean islands. The island of 
Chios for example, had to pay 10.000 sequins from resin trees of the island. 
Cicala did not help bailo Zane for the negotiations of Venetian subjects who were 
made slaves in the Empire. Besides, in this period the Republic of Venice had 
difficulty in finding grain and for a few years bought from the Ottomans. In 1592, 
despite the efforts of bailo Marco Antonio Venier and Matteo Zane, Cicala 
interrupted the negotiations for grain, warning the Sultan for the Imperial 
needs.264 Cicala’s attitude against Venetians was so apparent that according to the 
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French Ambassador, Cicala would die happy the day after he conquered 
Venice.265 
As we can understand, all Venetian bureaucrats always had the tendency to 
have political friends in key positions for their lobbying inside the court. When it 
came to ethnical and religious similarities the Ottoman converts once had, not 
only they but also Venetians had the tendency to create strong networks, 
considering it as a political tool rather than emotional motivation. While Sultan 
Safiye and Gazanfer became the main figures of significant faction in the Ottoman 
politics of the 16th century, they did not hesitate, to ally with the Venetians, 
especially Sultan Safiye, behaving as a descendent of a Venetian noble family. It 
is clear that Cicala’s attitude was very uncomfortable and like a stranger to 
Venetians. While they were expecting to take advantage of Cicala’s apparent 
identity, they encountered Cicala’s apparent hatred. 
As an Ottoman statesman and the slave of the Sultan, the Grand Admiral 
Cicala represented the supremacy and power of the Ottoman Sultan Murad III in 
the Mediterranean. Even if his surveillance was regarded aggressive by the 
Venetians, for the balance of power in the Mediterranean Sea, Cicala was not 
willing to leave the area open to any authority. Besides, in the 16th century piracy 
started to involve the imperial maritime activities when important corsairs such as 
Uluç Ali from Calabria, Turgut Reis and Hasan Veneziano, who were famous 
corsairs that became later the Ottoman Admirals, started to continue their 
activities under the Sultan’s protection.266 Cicala, once a Genoese corsair together 
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with his father could find the possibility to use his old skills and remind himself of 
his surname. 
While Venetian bureaucrats were trying to make friends inside the court, 
they recognized the possibility of making this process easier through presents. As 
reported in relazioni and dispatches of different bailos, they had to present 
valuable gifts not only to the Sultan and Sultanas in important events, but also to 
other statesmen whom they asked for appointments to resolve their problems. 
During their negotiations with Cicala, bailos spent much money and presented 
gifts, as they did for Sultan Safiye, Gazanfer and other important statesmen close 
to the Sultan. However, Venetians always had a tendency to see this as a 
corruption inside the court. As it was mentioned before, they always complained 
about the money they had to spend for negotiations. Especially Cicala was always 
described as a corrupted statesman, who took advantage of his position as an 
influential man. As we understand Venetians disregarded the tradition of peşkeş 
inside the Ottoman court. According to bailo Francesco Contarini, making 
presents was a tradition of the court also among the statesmen. When the Republic 
of Venice sent him five valuable French made watches, he pointed out that these 
gifts would be presented carefully by choosing the more important statesmen in 
the proper occasion. He also added that Ottomans chose contacting Venetians 
even for products not made in Venice. On this occasion they did not go to the 
French ambassadors, but to the Venetian bailos. Francesco Contarini also added 
that one of the watches would be given to Mehmet Kira, who was Sultan’s uncle 
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and very important man in the court as well as a Veneto-phile.267 According to 
bailo Girolamo Cappello, Cicala could only soften Safiye’s hatred through the 
gifts or money that he presented to her, as he knew her greedy character. It was 
not only Cicala that understood Safiye’s greed. Hadım Hasan Pasha became the 
Gran Vizier, thanks to the promise he made to Safiye that he would sustain her 
economically for the mosque that she wanted to build as long as she supported 
him in this title. Besides, there was Kira Kadın who economically supported 
Safiye, in order to stay close to the Ottoman ports.268 
 
 
3.4 Relations with Hereditary Family  
 
In 1593, the Spanish Empire, aware that Cicala’s family remained in 
Messina, sent his brother Carlo Cicala, who was the subject of the Spanish crown, 
to Constantinople. As the Venetian bailo in Rome Polo Paruta understood from 
the Spanish dispatches, the King was very ill and tried to negotiate with the 
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Ottomans through Cicala’s brother.269 The Spanish crown sent high rank officers 
with Carlo in order to get a respond from the negotiations.270 It was rumored in 
the court that Carlo arrived to convince the Ottomans not to interfere with the 
French affairs of the Spanish court. Moreover, the Spanish offered not to organize 
a league against the Turks if they cancelled the attack of Candia.271 Carlo tried to 
benefit from the situation which was noticed even by the bailo for the beginning 
of his arrival. 272 Even if he was not regarded as a high rank Spanish statesman, he 
would try to secure Spanish interest as well as his own.273 Bailo Matteo Zane had 
the opportunity to speak at length with Signor Carlo Cicala, as he reported. Carlo 
told that he had no intention of negotiating between the two Emperors; he was 
here on his own private business alone. He also had a passport from the Sultan 
and the protection of his brother.274 Moreover to become successful in his 
mission, Cicala tried to convince his brother to be Muslim and forced him to 
return back when he was already in Ragusa. However his efforts remained in 
vain.275  
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In his second arrival to Constantinople in 1600 this time as a Spanish 
ambassador, Carlo tried to obtain the Ducat of Naxos276, although he was paid by 
the Spanish crown for the negotiations.277 However when he was expected to take 
it, due to the intervention of the Ottoman religious authorities Carlo lost his 
opportunity again because of his refusal of conversion to Islam. Moreover, his 
mother also had to convert to the Islam.278 For the last time in 1604, Carlo Cicala 
came to Constantinople to make a secret pact with his brother in return of Cicala’s 
service to the Christianity. His efforts went in vain and Carlo abandoned his desire 
to obtain benefit from the Ottoman Empire.279 Even when he returned to Scio 
where Carlo established his second home to continue his relations with his 
brother, Cicala could not save himself from accusation of infidelity. According to 
an arz sent to the Sultan by Hafız Ahmet Pasha, the Pope in Rome and other 
Christian princes had some plans to take advantage of Carlo and they were very 
optimistic about him.280 Carlo, however, was not willing to give up on the 
advantages of his brother’s position and constantly provided information about the 
King of France and the Republic of Venice to him, while he was in Chios. In this 
way, he could act as a pawn of the Turks and cover up his grain trade.281 He was 
very involved in grain commerce that he kept on even during the negotiations. In 
1597, one of his ships was captured by the Venetians because of the shortage of 
grain in the Venetian Republic. Carlo resolved the problem in a diplomatic way 
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with the intervention of the Order of the Knights of Malta and the Venetian Senate 
turned the grain back.282 Moreover Carlo became a great problem for the 
Venetians, while working for the Spanish crown’s interest in Corfu. The Spanish 
Empire also wanted to take advantage of the island, as Corfu was an important 
passage for the Venetian Senate to collect intelligence on Ottomans.283 In 1600, 
Venetian dominions in Corfu were attacked by the armadas of the viceroys of 
Napoli and Sicily while Carlo settled there for commerce and intelligence. He also 
sent the detailed maps of the fortifications in Corfu, for the attacks.284  
Meanwhile, Carlo also sent two letters to the viceroy of Sicily in order to 
warn them about the movement of the Ottoman Armada even before he left Chios. 
Firstly Carlo showed his sadness for his brother’s attack on Reggio and other 
regions in Calabria at the same year. He also informed them that his brother 
obtained from a Ragusan the maps of Manfredonia and Taranto. However, Carlo 
in his return took the responsibility of calculating the damage Cicala gave to the 
Spanish crown and of espionage in the Levant against the Spain. Carlo turned into 
an instrument that kept his brother close to the Spanish Empire.285     
When his brother sent letters, Cicala was very careful about them. In order 
to understand the content of the letters sent in 1600, Cicala firstly threatened the 
bailo to translate the letters and not to tell anyone. Then, he showed them to the 
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Sultan for the negotiations.286 The Sultan wanted Cicala to respond to the Spanish. 
He wanted Strigonia from the Spain as a sign of their willingness for peace. Carlo 
also could take some islands in Archipelago for the negotiations.287 For another 
letter sent in 1599 by Carlo himself, Cicala took the help of the bailo Capello as 
he was not fluent in enough lingua franca. Carlo gave new information about the 
Christian princes and talked about the Venetians that sent 2000 French soldiers in 
Curzola. Despite Carlo’s intelligence, Cicala was very careful and warned the 
Sultan not to believe all he said as he could have an intention to break the peace 
between the Ottomans and Venetians.288 
As Cicala himself, his brother’s presence also became a trouble for the 
Venetian bailo inside the court. As the French Ambassador revealed a gossip that 
Carlo was there in order to induce the Ottoman army to attack Venice, so Venice, 
the Pope, Florence, Savoy, and other Italian Princes would have to ally 
themselves with Spain against the Ottomans.289 According to this gossip, Venetian 
bailo had already felt away. In order to block the gossip, bailo Marco Venier had 
to make a public apperance despite the chaos in Constantinople among the 
soldiers. As the bailo learned from Carlo’s close friend, he stayed all night in the 
arsenal with his brother the Kapudan, eating and drinking and sleeping in the 
same bed. Cicala has frequently told his brother that Ottomans had no enemies in 
the world like the Venetians. However Carlo’s presence did not please Cicala’s 
men in the Arsenal. As a conversation with them, because of the presence of his 
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brother, Cicala was regarded as a spy in the Ottoman Empire. The bailo was very 
disturbed about Carlo’s presence when he saw the two brothers’ behaviors even 
had the same attitude when they both did not recognize French Ambassador and 
was not aware that there was King in France.290 
As we can see, despite the compliments about Cicala’s fidelity to the 
Ottoman Empire by the elite inside the court and his brother’s distrustful position 
between the two Empires291, the Sultan could see him as an ambassador for his 
negotiations and take the advantage of his presence. Besides the Sultan trusted 
Cicala, as he was informed about all the negotiations between Cicala brothers. As 
Scipione wrote in his letters sent to Carlo before his arrival, the Sultan was eager 
to establish peace and negotiations with Spain despite some of his conditions.292 
Through Cicala’s and the Sultan’s behaviors we can understand that both brothers 
were regarded as diplomats and intermediaries between two Empires. 
Bailos asserted that Carlo actually knew that the Spanish would not give 
up Strigonia, but that his purpose was only the title he would get from the 
Ottomans and he most certainly did not want the Spanish King to hear about the 
agreements done about him due to his fear of losing his territory in Messina.293 
Moreover, Carlo’s desire to obtain a title in the Ottoman Empire or seek his 
fortune in the Levant did not finish when he returned to Sicily. He worked to 
defend the rights of the Messina aristocracy against the Spanish Empire.294 
However, Carlo could obtain this important duty after his brother Cicala’s death 
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in Diyarbakır in 1606. Besides in 1608 he became the governor of an important 
religious institution, namely Arciconfraternita degli Azzurri in Messina, where he 
was also elected in 1597 and stabilized his position again in his hometown.295 A 
long time later, Carlo tried to communicate with his nephew Cigalazade Mahmut 
in order to seek the fortune of his son Gianbattista this time that turned out to be 
only another failure for him.296 Despite Carlo’s failure, another Cicala family 
member Domenico Cicala, a relative of Cicalazade’s father became voluntary for 
Spanish-Ottoman negotiations. Domenico knew Ottoman language and lived for 
some time in the Ottoman territories.297           
In 1594, Cicala arrived in Messina to see his mother and his relatives, but 
he was not allowed by the Spanish authorities to see them. In order to show his 
power or just for revenge, he attacked Reggio without any counter attacks by the 
Spanish armada. Cicala burned the city with his men and let them loot the city for 
four days. According to the letters that he sent to his mother, Cicala told that he 
burnt the city, because his mother was captured and tortured.298 In another letter 
that he sent to his mother through the vice- duke of Macheda and the Pope 
Clement VIII, Cicala expressed his desire to see his mother. Besides he added that 
if his mother loved him, she would find a way to take the permission of seeing 
him, as Cicala loved all his family reciprocally. He also promised them let them 
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turn back after their meeting.299 Lucrezia Cicala could take the permission of the 
Pope in 1598 with his Capuchin friar nephews Antonio and Vincenzo with the 
promise of convincing Cicala to return to Christianty.  Cicala could see his mother 
and his family in his second arrival to Sicily under the surveillance of his 
Capuchin relatives. As promissed to the Pope, they tried to convince him, but it 
did not work. In return, Cicala tried to convince his brother Carlo to be Muslim, 
but could not be successful, either.300 
When Cicala tried to convince his family to be Muslims, he was trying to 
show his fidelity to the Islamic faith. He also tried to consolidate his fidelity to the 
Sultan by not speaking in Italian even if he could easily understand as the bailo 
observed.301 In this way, he could eliminate the suspicion over his Ottoman 
identity. Besides, he was not the only convert who tried to communicate with his 
family in this period. In different ways, Gazanfer, Admiral Hasan Veneziano or 
Sultan mothers Safiye and Nurbanu had also the tendency to the keep their ties 
with their homeland, the Republic of Venice. Although it could be seen as a 
phenomenon of the period, their actions were always open to discussion of fidelity 
among their enemies. For example, despite knowing Italian and inviting his 
family member to the Palace, being the head of the Sultan’s private chambers, 
Gazanfer was expected to intervene directly in the negotiations and assert his 
opinions. However, he escaped from direct negotiations with European 
ambassadors especially with Venetians. He had a tendency to ignore his origins 
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inside the court. As the bailo observed, he did not want to leave any suspicion that 
he was still a Venetian, by staying away from them.302 Also bailo Girolamo 
Cappello said that Gazanfer concealed his emotions, despite remembering his 
hometown very well. When he saw that Sultan Murad III was very favorable 
about Venetian issues, he started to be favorable, too. He even tried to stop 
Cicala’s aggressive attitudes in order not to bother the Sultan.303 Even if Cicala 
tried to convert his family in Islam, the sailors under his command became 
discontent and suspicious about his loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan, because 
Cicala’s armada did never attacked to the Spanish Armada and his brothers were 
paid by the Spanish crown. As the Venetian bailo learned from a Spanish 
bureaucrat Filippo was paid 1000 golden coins, while Carlo received 600.304 
As it was pointed out by Metin Ibrahim Kunt in his article Ethnic- 
Regional (Cins) solidarity in the 17th century Ottoman Establishment, converted 
people of the ruling elite inside the Ottoman Empire could establish such relations 
with their family as Cicala tried to do. “Not only did the slaves remember, then, 
their original homelands, native languages, and customs, but they were in contact 
with other members of their families. All these factors undoubtedly helped to 
establish solidarity among Ottomans with a common background. Ottoman 
writers refer to this phenomenon as a very natural feature of Ottoman society.”305  
Gazanfer was an important example of this phenomenon. Gazanfer and his brother 
Cafer were captured with their mother Maria Franceschina Michel while they 
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were traveling through Budua to see their father who was a chancellor there. Both 
became very valuble men for Selim II.306After his rise inside the court as the 
guardian of the Sultan’s Ports, Gazanfer became close to Sultan Mother Safiye 
and received her protection. He could bring his sister Beatrice in Constantinople. 
Beatrice converted to Islam with the name of Fatma Hatun, married an ally of 
Gazanfer, Çerkez Ali Aga and worked for Gazanfer’s benefits inside the Harem 
thanks to her close relationship with Safiye. In 1600, Gazanfer also invited also 
his nephew, Beatrice’s son born from her marriage in the Venetian Republic.307 
Besides Gazanfer had come to the court of Selim II with his brother Cafer Aga 
who became then an important as did his brother, but died long before him in 
1582.308 Gazanfer had other Venetian allies inside the court. The famous corsair 
Andrea Celeste named Hasan Veneziano became the Grand Admiral of the 
Ottoman armada between 1588 and 1591. Marcantonio Querini named 
Frankbeyoğlu Mehmed Aga took important duties and died as the leader of the 
cavaliers in the Sipahi troops in 1602. Mother Sultans Nurbanu and Safiye were 
important examples of using ethnical ties as a political tool. Despite being 
Albanian by origin, both women sultans represented themselves as originally 
Venetian aristocrats.309 There were also Osman Aga and his brother doctor 
Franghini who were a protégés of Damad İbrahim and apparent supporters of the 
Venetian bailo inside the court.310  They did not only enrich their power with 
noble ties in the Harem, but also formed important diplomatic relations to obtain 
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benefit inside the court. However, as we can assume, ethnical ties were not 
necessarily always a great motivation to create networks when the interests of 
different people from the same ethnics conflicted as happened between Safiye and 
Cicala. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
As the Venetian adventure in the Levant commerce started long before the 
Ottoman presence there, the Serenissima Republic of Venice was very well 
prepared in terms of protecting their political, judicial and economic rights against 
the Ottoman Empire. Through the presence of a bailo, the Republic not only 
protected their subjects and rights inside the Empire, but also had the opportunity 
of observing the Ottoman governmental mentality through its institutions, the 
Sultan and finally a very important part of the system: the servants. During their 
stay in the capital of the Empire, they had the opportunity of observing the 
Arsenal, the armies and the Armada of the Ottoman Empire, the condition of the 
Ottoman treasure or the Ottoman subjects’ social and economic life. The presence 
of the bailo helped the Republic of Venice follow the ambiance of the Empire and 
find more accurate and quick solutions to their needs. The bailo also tried to keep 
the relations close with the Sultan through important gifts, while also establishing 
friendship with the important members of the court, namely royal and converted 
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people. As the administrative systems and mentality of the two states were totally 
different from one another, the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire never 
had stable relations. As a result, all bailos had difficulty in completing their 
charge in the Levant. In the Venetian Republic all important governmental duties 
were only open to aristocracy. Therefore, the presence of converts in important 
duties in the Ottoman side was always challenging to accept for the Venetians. 
Each Venetian bailo had to negotiate with the servants of the Sultan in order to 
resolve their problems. The servants were once simple subject people with 
different religions and from different regions, who then became a high rank 
member inside the Ottoman Empire. As the Venetians stated, these servants “were 
made Turks,” and easily changed their social and economic status by showing 
fidelity to the Sultan and his religion. This kind of social mobility was impossible 
in the European world. For a Venetian bureaucrat, who was naturally born 
aristocratic, it was also unacceptable. When we observe the attitude of the 
Venetian aristocrats in the court through their relazioni and dispacci, we can 
easily see their disappointment of having to have held important negotiations with 
the converts. Besides, they always stated their shock about the early identity of the 
converts and they criticized these people harshly, and when they did not approve 
the qualifications of an Ottoman statesman or their attitude against themselves, 
they put the blame on their low class origin. In addition, after the loss of Cyprus, 
Venetians adopted a more sensitive approach in analyzing Veneto-Ottoman 
Relations and their position inside the court. Many times, the bailos depicted the 
situation as Cicala had personal hatred against them. When we observe the 
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Venetian documents, we can see that for Venetians, aristocracy was not 
something that could be gained through education or conversion.  
When we observe Scipione Cicala as an example of a convert, we can see 
different aspects of the 16th century Mediterranean World and especially of the 
Veneto-Ottoman relations. Scipione Cicala, as the son of famous Genoese corsair 
Visconte Cicala, started his career under the Spanish flag. While he could 
continue his life as famous a corsair as his father, his life changed with the loss of 
a sea battle. Scipione was presented by Barbarossa as a gift to Sultan Süleyman I 
and became the Admiral of the Ottoman Armada in the course of time along with 
other important duties. He even had the chance to visit his mother in Southern 
Italy and even attempted to participate in a rebellion with the locals against the 
Spanish authority there and then attacked the coasts. Cicala also tried to establish 
a career for his younger brother Carlo, while his other brother Filippo remained 
loyal to the Spanish crown and never had the opportunity to rise as did his brother 
Cicala. By the presence of Cicala brothers, we can easily see how talents became 
more useful than loyal blood to make a career and fortune inside the Ottoman 
Empire. However, I did not argue in my study the conditions and difficulties of 
the conversion inside the Ottoman Empire. My main aim was to show the 
differences between the establishment of Venetian and Ottoman administration, to 
understand the bailos’ point of view of the convert as a concept. Cicala not only 
preserved his surname but also used it positively as a corsair who knew the 
Mediterranean Sea, its people and the tactics of fight. With the same qualifications 
he became the target of the Spanish Empire and the Papal State this time as a 
possible traitor to the Ottoman Empire to ruin it. Carlo, the younger brother, also 
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became their target who was first a mediator, then an ambassador between the 
Ottoman and the Spanish Empire. Meanwhile, Carlo tried to take advantage of his 
brother’s career to become a tax collector of the Ottoman Sultan.  By the complex 
figure of Carlo as a merchant of slaves and grain under Spanish protection and a 
mediator and an ambassador, we see the different aspects of the 16th century 
Mediterranean actors who played important roles between different sides of the 
same sea. Moreover, the intention of the Spanish and Papal states on Cicala 
brothers indicates that in the other side of the Mediterranean world, the identity of 
an Ottoman convert was never regarded as total loss of the Christian flag. There 
were always different intentions over the convert such as taking advantage of his 
presence or regaining one lost member of Christianity. We can also observe that 
the Republic of Venice never gained anything from Cicala’s presence as a capable 
and successful member of Italian peninsula of the Spanish Empire, in terms of the 
benefits of the Christian world or political benefits. On the contrary, Cicala 
always became an obstacle to the Republic of Venice inside the Ottoman court. 
There was a general tendency among the converts to help their ex-compatriots and 
among Italian converts to have good relations with the Venetian bureaucrats. One 
of the most influential figures of the 16th century Ottoman court Gazanfer and the 
important Sultana Safiye supported each other and known for their Italian origin, 
they also became good allies of the Venetian bailo. Safiye was known as an ex-
Venetian aristocratic family member inside the court and she took advantage of 
this and the bailo became an important member of his faction. Significantly, 
Cicala always remained an enemy to Safiye with his anti-Venetian policies and 
also a rival to the other members of her faction such as Damad Ibrahim, Ferhad 
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and Halil Pashas. It should be noted though that as the different bailos reported 
Safiye was originally Albanian, but she revealed herself as Venetian, as did 
Sultana Nurbanu before her. Gazanfer, however, took some members of his 
hereditary family by his side and established good relations with other Italians 
such as Hasan Veneziano or Frenkbeyoğlu. However, when we observe the 
relations between Safiye, Gazanfer and Cicala and in addition to other important 
figures close to Cicala such as Koca Sinan, Hoca Sadeddin, we can see that 
having the same ethnicity becomes only a weak motivation for the converts. 
When their personal interests were included or their faction was damaged, the 
relations easily changed. Old enemies could become new allies as Safiye made 
peace with Cicala for a short time after the loss of Gazanfer, or Hoca Sadeddin, 
who was supporter of Cicala, changed his attitude after his promotion to the Gran 
Vizierate after the Ottoman victory on Habsburgs in 1595, when Cicala started to 
become very aggressive against the Venetians and did not support his son’s 
promotion. Converts used their parental ties in order to reinforce their factions and 
their positions. More than emotional reasons the converts made practical moves 
and regarded their hereditary family as man power for their new household. 
Meanwhile as long as they did not become a danger for the Sultan’s authority, the 
converts not only could reveal their hereditary identity but also could establish 
relations with their homeland, while the Ottoman system took advantage of these 
ties and enriched its own men power. 
 
 
105 
 
 
 
 
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Archivio di Stato di Venezia 
 
Senato, Dispacci Costantinopoli (SDC), Filze 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 
25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56 
Senato, Secreta, Archivio Proprio, Roma, Filza 16 
Senato, Dispacci, Dispacci dei Rettori, Cipro, 1 
Senato, Dispacci, Provveditori da Terra e da mar e Altre Cariche, Pezzi: 823, 
1195  
Senato, Deliberazioni, Costantinopoli, Registro 1 
Senato, Deliberazioni, Roma, Ordinaria, Filza 1. 
 
Other 
 
Borghesi, Vilma (a cura di), Vita del Principe Giovanni Andrea Doria scritta 
da lui medesimo incompleta. Genova: Compagnia dei librai, 1997. 
Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English Affairs, 
existing in the archives and collections of Venice, and in other 
libraries of northern Italy. 38 vols. London: His Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 1864-1940. vol. VIII. 
106 
 
 
Civico Museo Correr, Leonardo Donà,  Fondo Donà dalle Rose, 23, 
Itinerario... Memorie... Relatione.... Ambasciatori.... Costantinopoli. 
Eugenio Albèri, Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato, serie III, 
Relazioni di Costantinopoli (Firenze, 1840-1855), 3 volumes, vol. 3 
Firpo, Luigi, ed., Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato, tratte dalle 
migliori edizioni disponibili e ordinate cronologicamente. Vol. 13: 
Costantinopoli (1590-1793). Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1984. 
Gerlach, Stephan. Türkiye Günlüğü. Translated by Türkis Noyan and edited 
by Kemal Beydilli. 2 vols. Istanbul: Kitapyayınevi, 2006. 
Hasan Beyzade. Hasan Bey-zade Tarihi. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004. 
İbrâhîm Peçevî. Târih-i Peçevî, 2 Vols. Istanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1980. 
Naima Mustafa Efendi. Tarih-i Naima. 4 Vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 
2007. 
Pedani-Fabris, Maria Pia, ed. Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato. Vol. 
14: Costantinopoli, Relazioni inedite (1512-1789). Padua: Bottega 
d’Erasmo, 1996. 
Selaniki Mustafa Efendi. Tarih-i Selaniki. İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1864. 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Akdağ, Mustafa. Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası. Ankara: Bilgi, 
1975. 
-----. Türkiye’nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2 
Vols. 1959-1971. 
Albèri, Eugenio, ed. Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato. Third 
Series. 3 Vols. Florence: Società editrice fiorentina, 1840-55. 
Arbel, Benjamin. "Nur Banu (c. 1530-1583): A Venetian Sultana?" Turcica, 
24 (1992). 
107 
 
-----. Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern 
Mediterranean. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995. 
Aymard, Maurice. Maurice Aymard, “XVI. Yüzyılın Sonunda Akdeniz’de 
Korsanlık ve Venedik,” İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisad Fakültesi 
Mecmuası XXIII/1-2. 219-238. 
Babinger, Franz. Mehmed the Conquerer and His Time. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1978. 
Baldissera, Eros. “Corano: primo tentativo di stampa Venezia 1538.” 
Available at 
http://venus.unive.it/arabic/arabiyat/doc/CoranVe%20per%20VIF.pdf 
Bennassar, Bartolomé and Lucile Bennassar, I cristiani di Allah: la 
Sstraordinaria Epopea dei Convertiti all’Islamismo nei Secoli XVI e 
XVII. Milan: Rizzoli, 1991. 
Benzoni, Gino. “Cicala, Carlo,” “Cicala, Filippo,” “Cicala, Scipione (Cigala-
zade Yusuf Sinan),” and “Cicala, Visconte.” In Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani XXV. Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1981. 
-----. “Il ‘farsi turco,’ ossia l’ombra del rinnegato.” In Venezia e i Turchi: 
Scontri e confronti di due civiltà. Milano: Electa, 1985. 
-----. Gino Benzoni, ed.,  Il mediterraneo nella seconda meta’ del ‘500 alla 
luce di Lepanto, Florence: L.S. Olschki, 1974. 
Bertele, Tommaso. Il palazzo degli ambasciatori de Venezia a 
Constantinopoli e le sue antiche memorie. Bologna: Apollo 1932. 
-----. Venedik ve Konstantiniyye: Tarihte Osmanlı- Venedik İlişkileri. Trans. 
Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2012. 
Bono, Salvatore. Corsari nel Mediterraneo: Cristiani e Musulmani fra 
Guerra, Schiavitù e Comercio. Milan: Mondadori, 1993. 
Börekçi,Günhan. Factions and Favorites at the Courts of Sultan Ahmed I and 
His Immediate Predecessors. Unpublished Ph.D thesis, The Ohio 
State University, 2010. 
-----, and Şefik Peksevgen. “Court and Favorites.” In Encyclopedia of the 
Ottoman Empire, edited by Gábor Ágoston and Bruce Masters. New 
York: Facts on File, 2009. 
Braudel, Fernand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the 
Age of Philip II. Translated by Siân Reynolds. 2 vols. New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers, 1973. 
108 
 
Bunes, Miguel Ángel de. La imagen de los musulmanes y del norte de África 
en la España de los siglos XVI y XVII: los Caracteres de una 
Hostilidad. Madrid: Instituto de Filología, CSIC, 1989. 
D’Avenia, Fabrizio. Nobilta allo specchio: ordine di Malta e mobilita sociale 
nella Sicilia moderna. Mediterranea Quaderni, 2009. 
Davis, Natalie Zemon. Trickster Travels: a Sixteenth-Century Muslim 
between Worlds. London: Faber and Faber, 2007. 
Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and 
Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. 
Eaton, Richard Maxwell. The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204-
1760. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Fabris, Antonio “Hasan ‘il Veneziano’ tra Algeria e Costantinopoli,” 
Quaderni di Studi Arabi 5 (1997). 
Fleischer, Cornell H. Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The 
Historian Mustafa Âli (1541 -1600). Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1986. 
Galluppi, Giuseppe. Nobilitario della citta di Messina. Napoli, 1877. 
Gökbilgin, M. Tayyip. “Cigala-zade.” Islam Ansiklopedisi. Istanbul: Türkiye 
Diyanet Vakfi, 1986. 
Griswold, William J. The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1591-1611. Berlin: 
Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983. 
Gürkan, Emrah. Espionage in the 16th Century Mediterranean: Secret 
Diplomacy, Mediterranean Go- Betweens and the Ottoman Habsburg 
Rivalry. Unpublished Ph.D thesis, The Georgetown University, 2012. 
Haedo, Diego de. Topographia e historia general de Argel. Madrid: Sociedad 
de Bibliofilos Espanoles, 1927. 
Hess, Andrew C. The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-century 
Ibero-African Frontier. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
İnalcık, Halil.  An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
-----. "An Outline of Ottoman-Venetian Relations." In Venezia: Centro di 
Mediazione tra Oriente e Occidente (secoli XV-XVI): Aspetti e 
109 
 
Problemi. Edited by Hans-Georg Beck, Manoussos Manoussacas, and 
Agostino Pertusi. Florence: Leo S. Olschk, 1977. 
Jorga, Nicolae. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi. Vol. 3. İstanbul: Yeditepe, 
2005. 
Kafadar, Cemal. Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman 
State. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995. 
Kumrular, Özlem. Avrupa’daTürk Düşmanlığının Kökeni, Türk Korkusu. 
İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008. 
Kunt, Metin. “Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century 
Ottoman Establishment.” International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. 5 (June 1974). 
Lercari, Andrea. “I Cicala: un‘antica e nobile famiglia genovese in Sicilia.” 
Storia 2 (2005), 56-67. 
Lybyer, Albert Howe. The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of 
Suleiman the Magnificient. New York: Russell and Russell, 1966. 
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Q. Skinner and R. Price, eds. Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
Minadoi, Giovanni Tommaso. La Historia della guerra fra Turchi et 
Persiani. Rome: Stamperia di I. Tornerio e B. Donangeli, 1587. 
Montuoro, Domenico. “I Cicala, una famiglia feudale tra Genova, Sicilia, 
Turchia e Calabria.” Mediterranea: Ricerche Storiche VI (2009). 
Niederkorn, Jan Paul. “Das «negotium secretum» der Familie Cicala”, 
Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 
101(2-4), 1993. 
-----. “Gesandte - Vermittler – Schwindler. Von den Schwierigkeiten 
Diplomatischer Kontakte mit Orientalischen und Osteuropäischen 
Mächten in der Frühen Neuzeit.” Österreichische Osthefte. 37 (1995). 
Oliva, Gaetano. “Sinan-Bassa (Scipione Cicala) Celebre Rinnegato Del 
Secolo XVI.” Archivio Storico Messinese, VIII (1907) and IX (1908). 
Otman, Elvin. The Role of Alvise Gritti within the Ottoman politics in the 
Context of the “Hungarian Question” (1526-1534). M.A. Thesis, 
Bilkent University, 2009. 
Özbaran, Salih. Bir Osmanlı Kimliği. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004. 
110 
 
Pappalardo, Salvo. “Ambizione politica, commercio e diplomazia alla fine del 
XVI secolo: Carlo Cicala.” In Acque, terre e spazi dei mercanti: 
Istituzioni, gerarchie, conflitti e pratiche dello scambio dall’età , 
antica alla modernità .  Daniele Andreozzi, Loredana Panariti and 
Claudio Zaccaria, eds. Trieste: Editreg, 2009. 
Parry, V. J. “Cighala-zade Yusuf Sinan Pasha.” Encyclopedia of Islam. 
Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1978. 
Pedani, Maria Pia. “Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy.” Turcica 
32 (2000). 
-----. “Veneziani a Costantinopoli alla fine del XVI secolo.” Quaderni di Studi 
Arabi 5 (1997); 67-84. 
Peirce, Leslie. The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman 
Empire. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Preto, Paolo. I Servizi Segreti di Venezia. Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994. 
-----. Venezia e I Turchi. Firenze: G.C. Sansoni, 1975. 
Priovano, Carlo, ed. Venezia e i Turchi: Scontri e confronti di due civiltà. 
Milano: Electa, 1985. 
Radushev, Evgeni. “The Ottoman Ruling Nomenclature in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries.” Bulgarian Historical Review. 3-4 (1998). 
Ricci, Giovanni. Ossessione Turca: In una Retrovia Cristiana dell’Europa 
Moderna. Bologna: il Mulino, 2002. 
Rinieri, Ilario. Clemente VIII e Sinan Bassa Cicala. Roma: Civiltà Cattolica, 
1898. 
Rothman, Natalie E. Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between 
Venice and Istanbul. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012. 
Rycaut, Paul, Sir. The Present State of the Ottoman Empire. London: Printed 
by T.N. for Joanna Brome, 1682. 
Scaraffia, Lucetta. Rinnegati: per una Storia dell’Identita Occidentale. Bari: 
Editori Laterza, 1993. 
Sola Castaño, Emilio. Los que Van y Vienen: Información y Fronteras en el 
Mediterráneo Clásico del Siglo XVI. Alcalá de Henares: Universidad 
de Alcalá, 2005. 
111 
 
-----. Uchalí: El Calabrés Tiñoso, o el mito del corsario muladí en la 
frontera. Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra, 2011. 
Soykut, Mustafa. Image of the “Turk” in Italy: A History of the “Other” in 
Early Modern Europe: 1453-1683. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 
2001. 
Şakiroğlu, Mahmut. “Cigalazade Sinan Paşa.” İslam Ansiklopedisi, Vol II. 
İstanbul: Türk Diyanet Vakfı, 1940-1986. 
Tenenti, Alberto. Piracy and the Decline of Venice (1580-1615). Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967. 
-----. Venezia e i corsari, 1580-1615 (Bari: Laterza, 1961), 
Tezcan, Baki. The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social 
Transformation in the Early Modern World. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
Turan, Ebru. The Sultan’s Favorite: Ibrahim Pasha and the Making of the 
Ottoman Universal Sovereignty in the Reign of Sultan Suleyman 
(1516-1526). Ph.D thesis, University of Chicago, 2007. 
Turan, Şerafettin. Türkiye- İtalya İlişkileri: Selçuklular’dan Bizans’ın Sona 
Erişine. Vol. 1. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1990. 
Türkçelik, Evrim. Cigalazade Yusuf Sinan Pasha y el Mediterráneo entre 
1591- 1606. Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Universidad Autonoma de 
Madrid, 2012. 
Valente, Gustavo. Vita di Occhialì. Milano: Casa Editrice Ceschina, 1960. 
Vocabulario degli Accademici della Crusca. 3rd Edition. Floransa: 
Accademia della Crusca, 1691. 
Wittek, Paul. The Rise of the Ottoman Empire. London: The Royal Asiatic 
Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1966. 
Zinkeisen, Johann Wilhelm. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi. vol.2. İstanbul: 
Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2011. 
 
